Our wallet review process
We examine wallets starting at the code level and continue all the way up to the finished app that lives on your device. Provided below is an outline of each of these steps along with security tips for you and general test results.
Released
16th March 2026
Custody
Private keys generated and held by user
As part of our Methodology, we ask: Is the provider ignorant of the keys?
The answer is "yes". Private keys are generated by the user on the wallet.
Read more
Source code
Application build
If you have a binary for a version that doesn't appear on the list, you can dropselect the file here to register it so somebody can verify its reproducibility:
Featured on Bitcoin.org
This wallet is listed in the Bitcoin.org wallet directory. It had to pass these tests to be included.
Passed all 10 tests
We answered the following questions in this order:
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Fake".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:
The bigger wallets often get imitated by scammers that abuse the reputation of the product by imitating its name, logo or both.
Imitating a competitor is a huge red flag and we urge you to not put any money into this product!
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Announced but never delivered" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Announced but never delivered".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Announced but never delivered" and the following would apply:
Some products are promoted with great fund raising, marketing and ICOs, to disappear from one day to the other a week later or they are one-man side projects that get refined for months or even years to still never materialize in an actual product. Regardless, those are projects we consider “vaporware”.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Un-Released" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Un-Released".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Un-Released" and the following would apply:
We focus on products that have the biggest impact if things go wrong and while pre-sales sometimes reach many thousands to buy into promises that never materialize, the damage is limited and there would be little definite to be said about an unreleased product anyway.
If you find a product in this category that was released meanwhile, please contact us to do a proper review!
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Not a wallet".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:
If it’s called “wallet” but is actually only a portfolio tracker, we don’t look any deeper, assuming it is not meant to control funds. What has no funds, can’t lose your coins. It might still leak your financial history!
If you can buy Bitcoins with this app but only into another wallet, it’s not a wallet itself.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:
At this point we only look into wallets that at least also support BTC.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Provided private keys" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Provided private keys".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Provided private keys" and the following would apply:
The best hardware wallet cannot guarantee that the provider deleted the keys if the private keys were put onto the device by them in the first place.
There is no way of knowing if the provider took a copy in the process. If they did, all funds controlled by those devices are potentially also under the control of the provider and could be moved out of the client’s control at any time at the provider’s discretion.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Leaks Keys" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Leaks Keys".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Leaks Keys" and the following would apply:
Some people claim their paper wallet is a hardware wallet. Others use RFID chips with the private keys on them. A very crucial drawback of those systems is that in order to send a transaction, the private key has to be brought onto a different system that doesn’t necessarily share all the desired aspects of a hardware wallet.
Paper wallets need to be printed, exposing the keys to the PC and the printer even before sending funds to it.
Simple RFID based devices can’t sign transactions - they share the keys with whoever asked to use them for whatever they please.
There are even products that are perfectly capable of working in an air-gapped fashion but they still expose the keys to connected devices.
This verdict is reserved for key leakage under normal operation and does not apply to devices where a hack is known to be possible with special hardware.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Bad Interface" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Bad Interface".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Bad Interface" and the following would apply:
These are devices that might generate secure private key material, outside the reach of the provider but that do not have the means to let the user verify transactions on the device itself. This verdict includes screen-less smart cards or USB-dongles.
The wallet lacks either a screen or buttons or both. In consequence, crucial elements of approving transactions is being delegated to other hardware such as a general purpose PC or phone which defeats the purpose of a hardware wallet. For big exit scams, a companion app could always request two signatures - one for the coffee you are paying and a second to empty your wallet completely. The former could be broadcast while the latter only gets collected for later use.
Another consquence of a missing screen is that the user is faced with the dilemma of either not making a backup or having to pass the backup through an insecure device for display or storage.
The software of the device might be perfect but this device cannot be recommended due to this fundamental flaw.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "No source for current release found".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:
A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.
Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.
An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.
For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.
If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.
“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.
We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet. You should still prefer actual open source licenses as a competing wallet won’t use the code without giving it careful scrutiny.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.Application information
Background
Foundation Passport Prime is the third generation of the Foundation Passport line, succeeding the
It is a distinct product from its predecessors: new hardware, new OS, Bluetooth connectivity, an NFC-card backup system, and an open app platform. It should not be treated as a firmware update to the Passport Gen 2.
Operating System
Passport Prime runs KeyOS, a Rust microkernel operating system built on Xous — an open-source microkernel originally developed by bunnie and xobs for the Precursor/Betrusted project. Apps run sandboxed and communicate by message passing. Each app receives a hardened child seed derived from the master seed; no app has direct access to the master key.
Foundation requires that all apps distributed through the KeyOS app catalog be open source and reproducible. Developers may also distribute apps directly to users outside the catalog.
Product Description
- Display: 3.5” color IPS touchscreen with Gorilla Glass
- Battery: 1100 mAh Li-ion (non-removable)
- Dimensions: 55.5 × 104.8 × 11 mm, 93 g
- Chassis: Anodized aluminum
- Security Processor: Microchip SAMA5D2
- Secure Element: Microchip 608c
- Connectivity: QuantumLink Bluetooth, NFC, USB-C (charging and data), QR camera
- Storage: 50 GB encrypted file storage
- Manufacturing: Assembled in the USA
- Price: $349
Beyond Bitcoin, Passport Prime supports 2FA/TOTP codes, FIDO2 security keys, multiple cryptocurrency seeds, BIP-39 passphrases, and encrypted file storage — all managed through KeyOS.
Bitcoin Wallet
Passport Prime generates a master key on the device during setup; users can back it up as BIP-39 seed words (Foundation FAQ).
The wallet supports standard Bitcoin self-custody via PSBTs. Compatible software wallets include Sparrow, BlueWallet, Nunchuk, Casa, and Theya, among others supporting PSBTs via QR codes (Foundation CEO announcement, March 2026). Multisig is supported.
The device communicates with the
Envoy
companion app over
QuantumLink — a Bluetooth protocol in which messages are encrypted before reaching the
Bluetooth chip, which is isolated on a dedicated hardware component.
Backup
Magic Backup (recommended) splits the master key into three parts using 2-of-3 Shamir Secret Sharing — any two are sufficient for recovery:
- Parts 1 & 2: written to two of the three NFC KeyCards included with the device
- Part 3: stored on the user’s phone via Envoy, then synced to iCloud Keychain (iOS) or Android Auto-Backup (Android)
In addition, encrypted wallet metadata and settings are continuously synced to Foundation’s servers, identified only by a SHA-256 hash of the master key. Foundation states it cannot access this data — only the holder of the master key can decrypt it (Foundation backup docs).
Foundation states it never stores or has access to any part of the private key. Users who prefer not to use cloud storage can opt for Manual Backup instead, using all three KeyCards or a standard BIP-39 seed word export.
BIP39 compliant seed word representation of the Prime Master Key.
Source: Foundation backup docs
KeyOS is completely open source.
Omnivision camera for QR scanning
Source: Passport Prime product page
Dedicated Bluetooth and NFC connectivity chips
Source: Passport Prime product page
Can I connect Envoy to my own Bitcoin node? Yes, Envoy connects using the Electrum server protocol.
Source: Foundation FAQ
Reproducibility
Firmware is distributed via
KeyOS-Releases, built from
KeyOS. The GitHub Release asset is named
release.tar. The same binary also exists in the release repo branch under the descriptive
name KeyOS-vX.Y.Z-to-vA.B.C-Update.tar (e.g. KeyOS-v1.2.0-to-v1.2.1-Update.tar) as a
Git LFS object — both are identical in content and SHA-256. GitHub Release downloads also
include a manifest.json with signed and unsigned SHA-256 fields (verified for v1.2.1).
Verification Scope
The subject of verification for this entry is the Passport Prime firmware update binary —
for example release.tar for v1.2.1 — built from the
Foundation-Devices/KeyOS source repository,
with release metadata in
Foundation-Devices/KeyOS-Releases.
KeyOS is the source side of this verification and is not treated as a separate wallet entry.
The verification question is: can the firmware update installed on Passport Prime be reproduced
from the published source? No completed reproducibility verification has been performed yet.
This device is source-available.
Product page updated by Daniel Andrei R. Garcia
Do your own research
In addition to reading our analysis, it is important to do your own checks. Before transferring any bitcoin to your wallet, look up reviews for the wallet you want to use. They should be easy to find. If they aren't, that itself is a reason to be extra careful.