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OneKey: Bitcoin & Stocks

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Developer
ONEKEY LIMITED
X Discord
Released
27th April 2022
Source code
Public on github
Custody
Self-custodial: The user holds the keys

Passed all 7 tests

We check each wallet from its code to the app on your device, asking these questions in order:

Is this product the original?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Fake".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:

The bigger wallets often get imitated by scammers that abuse the reputation of the product by imitating its name, logo or both.

Imitating a competitor is a huge red flag and we urge you to not put any money into this product!

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is it a wallet?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Not a wallet".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:

If it’s called “wallet” but is actually only a portfolio tracker, we don’t look any deeper, assuming it is not meant to control funds. What has no funds, can’t lose your coins. It might still leak your financial history!

If you can buy Bitcoins with this app but only into another wallet, it’s not a wallet itself.

Is it for bitcoins?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:

At this point we only look into wallets that at least also support BTC.

Can it send and receive bitcoins?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins" and the following would apply:

If it is for holding BTC but you can’t actually send or receive them with this product then it doesn’t function like a wallet for BTC but you might still be using it to hold your bitcoins with the intention to convert back to fiat when you “cash out”.

All products in this category are custodial and thus funds are at the mercy of the provider.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Does the product allow self-custody?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys" and the following would apply:

A custodial service is a service where the funds are held by a third party like the provider. The custodial service can at any point steal all the funds of all the users at their discretion. Our investigations stop there.

Some services might claim their setup is super secure, that they don’t actually have access to the funds, or that the access is shared between multiple parties. For our evaluation of it being a wallet, these details are irrelevant. They might be a trustworthy Bitcoin bank and they might be a better fit for certain users than being your own bank but our investigation still stops there as we are only interested in wallets.

Products that claim to be non-custodial but feature custodial accounts without very clearly marking those as custodial are also considered “custodial” as a whole to avoid misguiding users that follow our assessment.

We have to acknowledge that a huge majority of Bitcoiners are currently using custodial Bitcoin banks. If you do, please:

  • Do your own research if the provider is trust-worthy!
  • Check if you know at least enough about them so you can sue them when you have to!
  • Check if the provider is under a jurisdiction that will allow them to release your funds when you need them?
  • Check if the provider is taking security measures proportional to the amount of funds secured? If they have a million users and don’t use cold storage, that hot wallet is a million times more valuable for hackers to attack. A million times more effort will be taken by hackers to infiltrate their security systems.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is the source code publicly available?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "No source for current release found".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:

A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.

Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.

An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.

For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.

If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.

“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.

We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet. You should still prefer actual open source licenses as a competing wallet won’t use the code without giving it careful scrutiny.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is the decompiled binary legible?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Obfuscated" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Obfuscated".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Obfuscated" and the following would apply:

When compiling source code to binary, usually a lot of meta information is retained. A variable storing a masterseed would usually still be called masterseed, so an auditor could inspect what happens to the masterseed. Does it get sent to some server? But obfuscation would rename it for example to _t12, making it harder to find what the product is doing with the masterseed.

In benign cases, code symbols are replaced by short strings to make the binary smaller but for the sake of transparency this should not be done for non-reproducible Bitcoin wallets. (Reproducible wallets could obfuscate the binary for size improvements as the reproducibility would assure the link between code and binary.)

Especially in the public source cases, obfuscation is a red flag. If the code is public, why obfuscate it?

As obfuscation is such a red flag when looking for transparency, we do also sometimes inspect the binaries of closed source apps.

As looking for code obfuscation is a more involved task, we do not inspect many apps but if we see other red flags, we might test this to then put the product into this red-flag category.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.

Distribution

Google Play Website

Build Verifications

Check your file

Drop the file you downloaded or installed to see if anybody verified it. Its SHA-256 is calculated in your browser.

or drop it here

Platform notes

On the Google Play Store, there are many apps that have Bitcoin in their name or description but don’t allow the user to use Bitcoin or they don’t look like Bitcoin wallets but turn out to be. We run our tests and document our findings.

Android

Companion App

Companion App

This app can act as a companion to a hardware wallet or air-gapped signing device. It handles network connectivity, transaction preparation, and blockchain data — while the signing device manages private key operations. The connection method is irrelevant (USB, QR, NFC, Bluetooth — all count). Examples: Mycelium+Trezor, Sparrow+Trezor, Specter Desktop+Specter-DIY, Envoy+Passport.

This feature is tagged on the companion app (the hot, networked side), not on the hardware wallet or signing device itself.

See also Issue #140 for discussion on verifying companion apps.

  • Convenience: Better UI/UX than tiny hardware wallet screens for browsing balances and preparing transactions.

  • Air-gapped compatibility: Keeps private keys offline while enabling easy transaction creation and broadcasting.

  • Trust requirement: The companion app is trusted to accurately display recipient addresses and amounts — always verify on your signing device’s screen before confirming.

  • Reproducibility matters: An unverifiable companion app undermines the security of an otherwise reproducible signing device.

Why we list it for this wallet

None of these three products can be used without our APP.

Source: Review

Updated Analysis 2025-07-21

Key Finding:
As of version 5.10.0, the OneKey Android app allows users to create a new wallet and access all wallet functions without connecting a hardware device. This was confirmed by video testing (see demonstration), where a seed phrase was generated and wallet operations were performed with no hardware present.

Implications:

  • The app is no longer solely a hardware companion; it is now a fully functional non-custodial wallet.
  • The previous verdict of nowallet is outdated and has been updated to reflect the app’s current capabilities.

Evidence:

  • Video demonstration (see link above).
  • Seed phrases were generated and provided during the test.
  • We were able to access BTC send/receive functions.

Possible Build Specifications

After analyzing the repository we find:

Tech Stack Summary:

  • React Native (JavaScript/TypeScript)
  • Yarn Workspaces (monorepo management)
  • Gradle (Android build system)
  • Node.js (>=20 required)
  • Java JDK (>=11 required)
  • Expo SDK (for development)
  • Android SDK & Android Studio (for building/running)

This app is now source available and for verification.

App Description from Google Play

All new designed and open source project of OneKey Wallet.

MULTI-CHAIN SUPPORT

Solana, Aptos, Near, STC, BTC, DOGE, LTC, Tron, EVM Chains (BSC, ETH, Arbitrum, Avalanche, Optimism, Polygon, CELO, CRO, FTM, HECO, OEC, xDai, and customized EVM Network).

Analysis

  • The app claims to be Open Source and has provided the repository
  • That app claims to support BTC sending and receiving
  • There is a presumption that it is non-custodial because of the reliance on the hardware wallets for the storage of private keys. Such as:

BACK UP WITH ONEKEY LITE

Back up and restore your wallet without typing a word.

We tried installing the app on several of our devices:

  • On a Samsung phone with Android 12
  • On BlueStacks 5 Nougat 32-bit
  • On BlueStacks 5 Pie 64-bit
  • APKCombo on BlueStacks5 Pie 64-bit
  • Android Studio Emulator Pixel 5 API 29 Android 10

And all failed.

As @loatheb1 has explained on GitLab:

“None of these three products can be used without our APP. We all need our APP to send data, process the received information inside the hardware, and then return it. This ensures that the private key in our hardware must be is safe.”

As a companion app to OneKey’s hardware wallets, the app does not function as a wallet itself.

iPhone

Update 2025-07-21

The Android App’s verdict is now source available and is for verification.

The iPhone app remains non-verifiable because all apps distributed through the Apple App Store are re-signed and encrypted by Apple before delivery to users. This process alters the original binary, making it impossible to directly compare the published app with a version built from source code. As a result, researchers and users cannot independently verify that the code released by developers matches the app actually installed on iOS devices.

(Analysis from Android review)

Fingerprint Authentication

Fingerprint Authentication

Fingerprint authentication in Bitcoin wallets enhances security by adding a biometric layer to the access control mechanisms. This feature leverages the unique patterns of a user’s fingerprint to grant access to the wallet, making unauthorized access significantly more difficult. Biometric authentication is generally faster and more convenient than traditional methods like passwords or PINs, as it eliminates the need to remember complex combinations. This form of authentication is particularly useful in mobile wallet applications, where ease of access and security are paramount. Fingerprint authentication minimizes the risk of phishing or brute force attacks that typically target password-based systems. Furthermore, it can be combined with other forms of security measures, like PINs or passwords, to create a multi-factor authentication system for added security. The use of biometric data, however, raises concerns regarding privacy and data security. Users must be assured that their biometric data is stored securely and not vulnerable to unauthorized access or breaches.

  • Enhanced security through a unique, non-replicable form of identification
  • Convenience and speed of access compared to traditional methods
  • Reduced risk of phishing and brute force attacks

Potential privacy concerns and dependency on device hardware capabilities.

Why we list it for this wallet

Multiple protection layers: App password, biometrics, and hardware wallet integration

Source: Store

Secure Elements

Secure Elements

Secure Elements in Bitcoin wallets refer to dedicated hardware components designed to enhance security. These elements are specialized circuits or chips embedded in the device, providing a fortified environment for storing sensitive data such as private keys. Unlike standard storage, Secure Elements are resistant to tampering and physical attacks, making them an ideal choice for safeguarding cryptographic data and operations. The use of Secure Elements is crucial, especially in hardware and mobile wallets, where the risk of physical theft or tampering is a concern. These elements can effectively shield private keys from a wide range of attacks, including sophisticated ones like side-channel attacks. They ensure that private keys never leave the secure environment, even when signing transactions, offering a higher level of security compared to software-only solutions. While adding a significant layer of security, Secure Elements may pose challenges in terms of wallet recovery. In cases where the device is damaged or lost, retrieving the private keys can be more complex compared to wallets that solely use software-based security measures.

  • Enhanced security against physical and sophisticated attacks
  • Increased protection for private keys and sensitive data
  • Peace of mind knowing that cryptographic operations are performed in a secure, isolated environment

Potential complexities in wallet recovery and dependency on specific hardware.

Why we list it for this wallet

Our hardware wallets use EAL6+ secure elements, supporting offline signing, Bluetooth, or QR code communication for real air-gapping.

Source: Store

Trade from and to other crypto currencies

Trade from and to other crypto currencies

Exchange one crypto currency for another. You “receive Xcoin to your Ycoin account” while in the background the wallet sends your Ycoin address to a service provider which gives it an Xcoin address which it then displays. Funds sent to that Xcoin address - to that service provider - are then sold for Ycoin and the returns are sent to the wallet’s Ycoin address.

Easily accept receiving more coins without actually holding them.

  • Sometimes the service is less favorable in its fees when used through a wallet integration than when using the service’s website.
  • Some of those services require registration which links your transactions to your ID.
  • The exchange provider might not deliver, making it complicated to prove what happened, who to talk to and how to ultimately recover funds.

Why we list it for this wallet

OneKey Swap aggregates liquidity across multiple chains and DEXs to find the best rates and lowest slippage.

Source: Store

Buy with Credit Card

Buy with Credit Card

Buy coins with your credit card from within the product.

Ease of use.

Buying with Credit Card usually comes with huge fees and the same exchange provider often offers a better rate when not using via a wallet integration.

Why we list it for this wallet

The system automatically compares quotes from multiple trusted providers to get you the best price.

Source: Store

Air Gapped: App works without internet

Air Gapped: App works without internet

Some apps mimic hardware wallets in that they don’t request permission to connect to the internet but instead they communicate through a companion app which has internet. That companion app might be on the same phone but with internet permission or it might be on a secondary phone such that the Air Gapped app can run on a phone that has no mobile or wifi internet configured at all.

Security: Splitting an app into a part that keeps the keys safe without access to leak them online and an app that has internet and all the rest can reduce the attack surface for the private keys. In theory this setup can be much more secure than the usual app that has both the private keys and internet access in one.

Why we list it for this wallet

Our hardware wallets use EAL6+ secure elements, supporting offline signing, Bluetooth, or QR code communication for real air-gapping.

Source: Store

Camera for Secure Transactions

Camera for Secure Transactions

Camera functionality in Bitcoin hardware wallets, represents a significant advancement in wallet security and data transmission. These wallets use their built-in cameras to scan QR codes, enabling a secure and efficient method for data exchange and transaction signing. The camera-based approach is integral to maintaining an air-gapped environment, meaning the wallet does not rely on potentially vulnerable USB or Bluetooth connections for communication. The process involves creating an unsigned transaction as a QR code using a compatible wallet app. This QR code is then scanned by the hardware wallet’s camera. Inside the wallet, the transaction is securely signed using the stored private key. The signed transaction is subsequently displayed as a new QR code on the wallet, which can then be scanned back by the app to broadcast it to the blockchain network. This method of using a camera for QR code scanning and transmission ensures that the private keys remain solely within the hardware wallet, significantly bolstering security against remote attacks. It also enhances privacy, as the wallet does not directly connect to the internet or other devices, thereby reducing exposure to potential vulnerabilities.

  • Enhanced security by maintaining an air-gapped environment
  • Increased privacy as the wallet does not directly connect to the internet
  • User-friendly transaction process with QR code scanning

Why we list it for this wallet

supporting offline signing, Bluetooth, or QR code communication for real air-gapping.

Source: Store

Custom Node Connection

Custom Node Connection

The wallet can be configured to connect to a user-specified, independently operated Bitcoin node — such as Bitcoin Core, Electrum Server, or other compatible full node software — instead of the wallet provider’s default servers. The key requirement is that the node is clearly independent from the wallet vendor: a third-party node the user controls or trusts.

  • Privacy: Transaction queries go to your own node rather than a third-party server, so no provider learns your wallet addresses or balances.

  • Security: No risk of a provider lying about your balance or the state of the network.

  • Sovereignty: Full independence from wallet provider infrastructure.

  • Requires running and maintaining your own Bitcoin node.
  • More complex initial setup compared to using the provider’s default servers.

Why we list it for this wallet

Custom RPC networks, batch address import, instant balance preview.

Source: Store

Companion App

Companion App

This app can act as a companion to a hardware wallet or air-gapped signing device. It handles network connectivity, transaction preparation, and blockchain data — while the signing device manages private key operations. The connection method is irrelevant (USB, QR, NFC, Bluetooth — all count). Examples: Mycelium+Trezor, Sparrow+Trezor, Specter Desktop+Specter-DIY, Envoy+Passport.

This feature is tagged on the companion app (the hot, networked side), not on the hardware wallet or signing device itself.

See also Issue #140 for discussion on verifying companion apps.

  • Convenience: Better UI/UX than tiny hardware wallet screens for browsing balances and preparing transactions.

  • Air-gapped compatibility: Keeps private keys offline while enabling easy transaction creation and broadcasting.

  • Trust requirement: The companion app is trusted to accurately display recipient addresses and amounts — always verify on your signing device’s screen before confirming.

  • Reproducibility matters: An unverifiable companion app undermines the security of an otherwise reproducible signing device.

Why we list it for this wallet

qr-wallet-sdk/ # QR-code hardware wallet SDK

Source: GitHub README

Transaction Batching

Transaction Batching

Batching allows to aggregate multiple payments into one Bitcoin transaction.

In Bitcoin, transactions always empty the output of received, prior transactions, so called “unspent transaction outputs” or UTXOs. Without batching, sending to five recipients requires the creation of five transactions with their change outputs - if you don’t have the exact amount you want to send to the recipient, you send “change” to yourself. This change UTXO gets then immediately spent in the next transaction and so on, building a chain of transactions.

  • Batching avoids creating intermediate outputs, making the transaction smaller and thus cheaper in terms of mining fees.
  • Batching avoids building chains of transactions. If one were to pay more than ten recipients, the network would probably not broadcast the later transactions as only short chains of unconfirmed transactions are being handled by full nodes. Batching fixes that.

Why we list it for this wallet

batch address import, instant balance preview.

Source: Store

Product page updated by Daniel Andrei R. Garcia

Community Opinions

These comments are contributed by Nostr users.

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Do your own research

In addition to reading our analysis, it is important to do your own checks. Before transferring any bitcoin to your wallet, look up reviews for the wallet you want to use. They should be easy to find. If they aren't, that itself is a reason to be extra careful.

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