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Enjin: Crypto & NFT Wallet

Google Play App Store Website

Latest release found by WalletScrutiny: 3.6.7 / 3.6.2

Developer
Enjin Pte. Ltd. (Android)
Enjin PTE LTD (iPhone)
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Released
Android: 1st January 2018
iPhone: 12th March 2018
Custody
Self-custodial: The user holds the keys

Our wallet review process

We examine wallets starting at the code level and continue all the way up to the finished app that lives on your device. Provided below is an outline of each of these steps along with security tips for you and general test results.

Passed 5 of 7 tests

We answered the following questions in this order:
We stopped asking questions after we encountered a failed answer.

Is this product the original?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Fake".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:

The bigger wallets often get imitated by scammers that abuse the reputation of the product by imitating its name, logo or both.

Imitating a competitor is a huge red flag and we urge you to not put any money into this product!

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is it a wallet?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Not a wallet".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:

If it’s called “wallet” but is actually only a portfolio tracker, we don’t look any deeper, assuming it is not meant to control funds. What has no funds, can’t lose your coins. It might still leak your financial history!

If you can buy Bitcoins with this app but only into another wallet, it’s not a wallet itself.

Is it for bitcoins?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:

At this point we only look into wallets that at least also support BTC.

Can it send and receive bitcoins?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins" and the following would apply:

If it is for holding BTC but you can’t actually send or receive them with this product then it doesn’t function like a wallet for BTC but you might still be using it to hold your bitcoins with the intention to convert back to fiat when you “cash out”.

All products in this category are custodial and thus funds are at the mercy of the provider.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Does the product allow self-custody?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys" and the following would apply:

A custodial service is a service where the funds are held by a third party like the provider. The custodial service can at any point steal all the funds of all the users at their discretion. Our investigations stop there.

Some services might claim their setup is super secure, that they don’t actually have access to the funds, or that the access is shared between multiple parties. For our evaluation of it being a wallet, these details are irrelevant. They might be a trustworthy Bitcoin bank and they might be a better fit for certain users than being your own bank but our investigation still stops there as we are only interested in wallets.

Products that claim to be non-custodial but feature custodial accounts without very clearly marking those as custodial are also considered “custodial” as a whole to avoid misguiding users that follow our assessment.

We have to acknowledge that a huge majority of Bitcoiners are currently using custodial Bitcoin banks. If you do, please:

  • Do your own research if the provider is trust-worthy!
  • Check if you know at least enough about them so you can sue them when you have to!
  • Check if the provider is under a jurisdiction that will allow them to release your funds when you need them?
  • Check if the provider is taking security measures proportional to the amount of funds secured? If they have a million users and don’t use cold storage, that hot wallet is a million times more valuable for hackers to attack. A million times more effort will be taken by hackers to infiltrate their security systems.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is the source code publicly available?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "No source for current release found".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:

A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.

Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.

An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.

For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.

If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.

“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.

We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet. You should still prefer actual open source licenses as a competing wallet won’t use the code without giving it careful scrutiny.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is the decompiled binary legible?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Obfuscated" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Obfuscated".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Obfuscated" and the following would apply:

When compiling source code to binary, usually a lot of meta information is retained. A variable storing a masterseed would usually still be called masterseed, so an auditor could inspect what happens to the masterseed. Does it get sent to some server? But obfuscation would rename it for example to _t12, making it harder to find what the product is doing with the masterseed.

In benign cases, code symbols are replaced by short strings to make the binary smaller but for the sake of transparency this should not be done for non-reproducible Bitcoin wallets. (Reproducible wallets could obfuscate the binary for size improvements as the reproducibility would assure the link between code and binary.)

Especially in the public source cases, obfuscation is a red flag. If the code is public, why obfuscate it?

As obfuscation is such a red flag when looking for transparency, we do also sometimes inspect the binaries of closed source apps.

As looking for code obfuscation is a more involved task, we do not inspect many apps but if we see other red flags, we might test this to then put the product into this red-flag category.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.

Distribution

Google Play Website

Build Verifications

Build cannot be done because the source code is not publicly available.

Platform notes

On the Google Play Store, there are many apps that have Bitcoin in their name or description but don’t allow the user to use Bitcoin or they don’t look like Bitcoin wallets but turn out to be. We run our tests and document our findings.

Android

Update 2024-07-20

There have been no updates regarding the public release of its source code.

Review 2022-12-17

Enjin: Blockchain & Crypto Wallet description starts promising:

“Your private keys are your own”

They advertise advanced securing techniques among which are:

An extensive independent security audit and penetration test found no security issues.

(You can read the report here)

But source code isn’t available on their website. So the user is left with only one choice: trust.

Our verdict: not verifiable.

Other observations

in-app browsing: “ENJOY SEAMLESS BROWSING Interact with any DApp with the single click of a button—without leaving the safety of your crypto wallet.”

looks very advanced, the list of features is tremendous. also an old player:

ABOUT ENJIN
Founded in 2009 and based in Singapore, Enjin offers an ecosystem of integrated, user-first blockchain products that enable anyone to easily manage, explore, distribute, and integrate blockchain-based assets.

on their main page, they advertise advanced securing techniques amongst which are:

  • Custom ARM instructions ensure that sensitive data is instantly deleted from your phone’s memory.
  • Enjin Keyboard. Built from scratch to protect you from any form of data sniffing or keyloggers.

iPhone

Update 2022-01-04: The iOS app is available again. (Twitter Screenshot)

Update 2021-08-26: This app is no more.

Enjin: Blockchain & Crypto Wallet description starts promising:

“Your private keys are your own”

They advertise advanced securing techniques among which are:

An extensive independent security audit and penetration test found no security issues.

(You can read the report here)

But source code isn’t available on their website. So the user is left with only one choice: trust.

Our verdict: not verifiable.

Other observations

in-app browsing: “ENJOY SEAMLESS BROWSING Interact with any DApp with the single click of a button—without leaving the safety of your crypto wallet.”

looks very advanced, the list of features is tremendous. also an old player:

ABOUT ENJIN
Founded in 2009 and based in Singapore, Enjin offers an ecosystem of integrated, user-first blockchain products that enable anyone to easily manage, explore, distribute, and integrate blockchain-based assets.

on their main page, they advertise advanced securing techniques amongst which are:

  • Custom ARM instructions ensure that sensitive data is instantly deleted from your phone’s memory.
  • Enjin Keyboard. Built from scratch to protect you from any form of data sniffing or keyloggers.
Hierarchically Deterministic

Hierarchically Deterministic

All accounts and keys are derived from one masterseed as defined in BIP 32, BIP 39, BIP 44, BIP 49, BIP 84 and BIP 86. While some wallets might use different definitions and not all support SegWit or Taproot, we only consider this feature as given if

  • the backup is a BIP 39 mnemonic
  • the funds are recoverable on a competitor’s product correctly implementing those standards
  • no address reuse
  • simple backup
  • no vendor lock-in

Why we list it for this wallet

Create or import a wallet and secure your 12‑word recovery phrase.

Source: Store

Unlimited Accounts

Unlimited Accounts

The user can create or restore secondary BTC accounts

  • Accounting: Multiple accounts allow for easier separation of funds.
  • Privacy: Using an account with a positive balance at all time makes it relatively easy for blockchain analysis companies to determine the full history of the wallet. By using multiple accounts, emptying them at times, the user can retain some privacy.

Why we list it for this wallet

Infinite wallet & address management – Create unlimited wallets for day‑to‑day use, savings, trading, or gaming and switch between them with one tap.

Source: Store

Fingerprint Authentication

Fingerprint Authentication

Fingerprint authentication in Bitcoin wallets enhances security by adding a biometric layer to the access control mechanisms. This feature leverages the unique patterns of a user’s fingerprint to grant access to the wallet, making unauthorized access significantly more difficult. Biometric authentication is generally faster and more convenient than traditional methods like passwords or PINs, as it eliminates the need to remember complex combinations. This form of authentication is particularly useful in mobile wallet applications, where ease of access and security are paramount. Fingerprint authentication minimizes the risk of phishing or brute force attacks that typically target password-based systems. Furthermore, it can be combined with other forms of security measures, like PINs or passwords, to create a multi-factor authentication system for added security. The use of biometric data, however, raises concerns regarding privacy and data security. Users must be assured that their biometric data is stored securely and not vulnerable to unauthorized access or breaches.

  • Enhanced security through a unique, non-replicable form of identification
  • Convenience and speed of access compared to traditional methods
  • Reduced risk of phishing and brute force attacks

Potential privacy concerns and dependency on device hardware capabilities.

Why we list it for this wallet

Client‑side AES‑256 encryption, 12‑word recovery phrase, plus fingerprint unlock or PIN keep your keys safe and private.

Source: Store

Trade from and to other crypto currencies

Trade from and to other crypto currencies

Exchange one crypto currency for another. You “receive Xcoin to your Ycoin account” while in the background the wallet sends your Ycoin address to a service provider which gives it an Xcoin address which it then displays. Funds sent to that Xcoin address - to that service provider - are then sold for Ycoin and the returns are sent to the wallet’s Ycoin address.

Easily accept receiving more coins without actually holding them.

  • Sometimes the service is less favorable in its fees when used through a wallet integration than when using the service’s website.
  • Some of those services require registration which links your transactions to your ID.
  • The exchange provider might not deliver, making it complicated to prove what happened, who to talk to and how to ultimately recover funds.

Why we list it for this wallet

Built‑in marketplace – Browse and trade on NFT.io or use other marketplaces or DEX integrations via the Dapp Browser.

Source: Store

Camera for Secure Transactions

Camera for Secure Transactions

Camera functionality in Bitcoin hardware wallets, represents a significant advancement in wallet security and data transmission. These wallets use their built-in cameras to scan QR codes, enabling a secure and efficient method for data exchange and transaction signing. The camera-based approach is integral to maintaining an air-gapped environment, meaning the wallet does not rely on potentially vulnerable USB or Bluetooth connections for communication. The process involves creating an unsigned transaction as a QR code using a compatible wallet app. This QR code is then scanned by the hardware wallet’s camera. Inside the wallet, the transaction is securely signed using the stored private key. The signed transaction is subsequently displayed as a new QR code on the wallet, which can then be scanned back by the app to broadcast it to the blockchain network. This method of using a camera for QR code scanning and transmission ensures that the private keys remain solely within the hardware wallet, significantly bolstering security against remote attacks. It also enhances privacy, as the wallet does not directly connect to the internet or other devices, thereby reducing exposure to potential vulnerabilities.

  • Enhanced security by maintaining an air-gapped environment
  • Increased privacy as the wallet does not directly connect to the internet
  • User-friendly transaction process with QR code scanning

Why we list it for this wallet

Instant NFT claims – Scan Enjin Beam QR codes to drop NFTs straight into your collection.

Source: Store

NFC (Near Field Communication)

NFC (Near Field Communication)

The wallet supports Near Field Communication (NFC) for wireless interaction with hardware wallets, payment terminals, or signing cards. NFC enables tap-to-sign or tap-to-pay functionality over a very short range (typically a few centimeters) without cables or QR codes.

  • Convenience: Quick tap interaction — no cables to connect or QR codes to scan.
  • Hardware wallet compatibility: Some hardware signing cards communicate exclusively via NFC.
  • Requires NFC hardware on both devices.
  • Very short range limits usability compared to QR-based air-gapped setups.

Why we list it for this wallet

(no justification provided by LLM)

Product page updated by Leo Wandersleb, Daniel Andrei R. Garcia

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Do your own research

In addition to reading our analysis, it is important to do your own checks. Before transferring any bitcoin to your wallet, look up reviews for the wallet you want to use. They should be easy to find. If they aren't, that itself is a reason to be extra careful.

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