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Ashigaru

Developer
Ashigaru Open Source Project
Released
20th September 2024
Source code
Public on

Source code on Tor

This project hosts its code on a Tor onion service. It opens only in Tor Browser.

http://ashicodepbnpvslzsl2bz7l2pwrjvajgumgac423pp3y2deprbnzz7id.onion/Ashigaru/Ashigaru-Mobile
Open in Tor Browser
Custody
Self-custodial: The user holds the keys
Status
Not updated in over a year.

Passed all 7 tests

We check each wallet from its code to the app on your device, asking these questions in order:

Is this product the original?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Fake".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:

The bigger wallets often get imitated by scammers that abuse the reputation of the product by imitating its name, logo or both.

Imitating a competitor is a huge red flag and we urge you to not put any money into this product!

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is it a wallet?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Not a wallet".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:

If it’s called “wallet” but is actually only a portfolio tracker, we don’t look any deeper, assuming it is not meant to control funds. What has no funds, can’t lose your coins. It might still leak your financial history!

If you can buy Bitcoins with this app but only into another wallet, it’s not a wallet itself.

The same goes for off-ramps that hold no balance at all: bitcoin (or gift cards) go in and fiat goes straight out to your bank. An off-ramp that keeps your fiat until you cash out is a wallet, just not for Bitcoin. One that keeps a bitcoin balance you can’t send out is ‘Can’t send or receive bitcoins’.

Is it for bitcoins?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:

At this point we only look into wallets that at least also support BTC.

A product that can send and receive other coins but only tracks Bitcoin addresses read-only is a wallet, just not for Bitcoin, so it gets this verdict. ‘Not a wallet’ is for products that hold no coins at all, such as pure portfolio trackers.

The same goes for off-ramps that credit your bitcoin to a fiat balance you later cash out: the app holds your money, but not as bitcoin.

Can it send and receive bitcoins?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins" and the following would apply:

If it is for holding BTC but you can’t actually send or receive them with this product then it doesn’t function like a wallet for BTC but you might still be using it to hold your bitcoins with the intention to convert back to fiat when you “cash out”.

All products in this category are custodial and thus funds are at the mercy of the provider.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Does the product allow self-custody?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys" and the following would apply:

A custodial service is a service where the funds are held by a third party like the provider. The custodial service can at any point steal all the funds of all the users at their discretion. Our investigations stop there.

Some services might claim their setup is super secure, that they don’t actually have access to the funds, or that the access is shared between multiple parties. For our evaluation of it being a wallet, these details are irrelevant. They might be a trustworthy Bitcoin bank and they might be a better fit for certain users than being your own bank but our investigation still stops there as we are only interested in wallets.

Products that claim to be non-custodial but feature custodial accounts without very clearly marking those as custodial are also considered “custodial” as a whole to avoid misguiding users that follow our assessment.

Balances on operator-dependent layers (Spark, Ark and similar) are judged by one question: “Can a user, with only what the app gives them and expecting help from nobody, actually force their money onto the Bitcoin blockchain?” Such a balance counts as self-custodial only for the part that the app itself shows the user could recover this way, calculated without network access at a fee rate the user chooses, and only once a recovery from that app has been demonstrated, because the app decides how the balance is split and therefore how much of it can come back. The rest of the balance is considered custodial.

We have to acknowledge that a huge majority of Bitcoiners are currently using custodial Bitcoin banks. If you do, please:

  • Do your own research if the provider is trust-worthy!
  • Check if you know at least enough about them so you can sue them when you have to!
  • Check if the provider is under a jurisdiction that will allow them to release your funds when you need them?
  • Check if the provider is taking security measures proportional to the amount of funds secured? If they have a million users and don’t use cold storage, that hot wallet is a million times more valuable for hackers to attack. A million times more effort will be taken by hackers to infiltrate their security systems.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is the source code publicly available?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "No source for current release found".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:

A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.

Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.

An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.

For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.

If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.

“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.

We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet. You should still prefer actual open source licenses as a competing wallet won’t use the code without giving it careful scrutiny.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is the decompiled binary legible?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Obfuscated" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Obfuscated".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Obfuscated" and the following would apply:

When compiling source code to binary, usually a lot of meta information is retained. A variable storing a masterseed would usually still be called masterseed, so an auditor could inspect what happens to the masterseed. Does it get sent to some server? But obfuscation would rename it for example to _t12, making it harder to find what the product is doing with the masterseed.

In benign cases, code symbols are replaced by short strings to make the binary smaller but for the sake of transparency this should not be done for non-reproducible Bitcoin wallets. (Reproducible wallets could obfuscate the binary for size improvements as the reproducibility would assure the link between code and binary.)

Especially in the public source cases, obfuscation is a red flag. If the code is public, why obfuscate it?

As obfuscation is such a red flag when looking for transparency, we do also sometimes inspect the binaries of closed source apps.

As looking for code obfuscation is a more involved task, we do not inspect many apps but if we see other red flags, we might test this to then put the product into this red-flag category.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.

Distribution

Build Verifications

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Platform notes

On the Google Play Store, there are many apps that have Bitcoin in their name or description but don’t allow the user to use Bitcoin or they don’t look like Bitcoin wallets but turn out to be. We run our tests and document our findings.

App Description

Ashigaru is a self-custodial Bitcoin wallet for Android. It is a fork of Samourai Wallet: its README says it uses “all commits from Samourai Wallet’s /master and /development branch up to 24th April 2024”, the day Samourai’s founders were arrested.

The app is not on Google Play. The only download is a direct APK from the project’s own git server, which is reachable over Tor only. Its address is in the repository field above; ashigaru.rs/download links to it and publishes a PGP-signed SHA-256 of each APK.

Analysis

We downloaded ashigaru_mobile_v1.1.1.apk (released 2025-03-03) over Tor on 2026-10-10.

  • Its SHA-256 is 13f7832417b48be902877dddc7b1ef4f3ddffe6891f42ef151d8cbd8070591ef, the same as the signed hash on the download page.
  • Package com.ashigaru.wallet, versionName 1.1.1, versionCode 111.
  • It is signed by the certificate OU=Ashigaru Wallet, with the SHA-256 fingerprint shown above as signer.
  • It bundles its own Tor (libKmpTor.so for all four ABIs).

The source is public under GPLv3. Tag v1.1.1 (commit dd1bcac71fe3) matches the release, and its app/build.gradle declares the same applicationId, versionCode and versionName as the APK. The project publishes reproducible build instructions and an unsigned APK hash for each release. For v1.1.1 that hash is 0209e3db0793f236849a2aaf51541df56420f9ca3a92d8ea553137273d7b95a5. We have not yet checked it ourselves.

There has been no release since v1.1.1 in March 2025, so the app was last updated more than a year ago.

The mobile app does not offer Whirlpool coinjoin. The v1.0.0 release notes list “Whirlpool coinjoin removed”. The Ashigaru Whirlpool coordinator launched later with a separate desktop client, Ashigaru Terminal. We therefore do not list the CoinJoin feature for this app.

Free and Open Source (FOSS)

Free and Open Source (FOSS)

The wallet’s source code is published under a license approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI) — such as MIT, GPL, Apache, or AGPL — allowing anyone to inspect, modify, and redistribute it. This is a prerequisite for independent security audits and reproducible builds. Licenses that are merely “source available” but not OSI-approved (e.g., those with Commons Clause restrictions, commercial use prohibitions, or other non-free terms) do NOT qualify. Reproducible builds are not sufficient alone.

  • Transparency: Anyone can verify what the code does — including whether it contains backdoors, bugs, or privacy-violating behavior.

  • Community auditing: More reviewers means vulnerabilities are more likely to be found and fixed.

  • Forkability: If the project is abandoned or goes rogue, the community can fork and continue it.

FOSS alone does not guarantee security. The released binary must also be reproducible from the public source to ensure users are actually running the code that was audited.

Why we list it for this wallet

Ashigaru mobile is released under the Free and Open Source license GNU GPLv3

Source: README (Ashigaru-Mobile repository, Tor only)

Advanced UTXO Control

Advanced UTXO Control

The wallet offers advanced control over which Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXOs) are spent. This goes beyond simple coin selection — it may include the ability to freeze or exclude specific UTXOs (e.g., dusting attacks or tainted coins), label UTXOs, or select inputs manually. The user does not necessarily need full visibility of all UTXOs, but has meaningful control over what gets spent.

  • Privacy: Prevent spending from UTXOs linked to unwanted transaction history, or avoid merging coins from different sources in one transaction.

  • Dust protection: Mark suspicious incoming transactions as “do not spend” to avoid revealing your wallet’s full UTXO set.

  • Fee optimization: Strategically select inputs to manage transaction size and fees.

Why we list it for this wallet

Select, label, freeze and unfreeze unspent transaction outputs (UTXOs) in your wallet

Source: ashigaru.rs

Transaction Batching

Transaction Batching

Batching allows to aggregate multiple payments into one Bitcoin transaction.

In Bitcoin, transactions always empty the output of received, prior transactions, so called “unspent transaction outputs” or UTXOs. Without batching, sending to five recipients requires the creation of five transactions with their change outputs - if you don’t have the exact amount you want to send to the recipient, you send “change” to yourself. This change UTXO gets then immediately spent in the next transaction and so on, building a chain of transactions.

  • Batching avoids creating intermediate outputs, making the transaction smaller and thus cheaper in terms of mining fees.
  • Batching avoids building chains of transactions. If one were to pay more than ten recipients, the network would probably not broadcast the later transactions as only short chains of unconfirmed transactions are being handled by full nodes. Batching fixes that.

Why we list it for this wallet

Save on fees by composing a single transaction to multiple recipients

Source: ashigaru.rs

TOR - The Onion Router

TOR - The Onion Router

TOR is a tool to shield the IP address of communicating parties. When communicating with a node on the TOR network, the communication is also necessarily end to end encrypted but not when communicating to a server on the internet that does neither use TOR nor ssl (https). Modern Androids allow to put apps behind a local TOR node independently of the provider offering TOR features. While this can be desirable to shield one’s IP address, it also might expose unencrypted data to different, probably more aware third parties. It also does not replace more advanced TOR features in which the wallet creates multiple TOR identities for different requests.

  • Privacy: TOR shields the client’s IP address and thus his real world location or identity from servers it talks to.
  • Speed: TOR means bouncing messages around a bit more with extra encryption. That makes it slower.

Why we list it for this wallet

Connect to your Dojo node and broadcast over the Tor network

(The v1.1.1 APK bundles its own Tor library, libKmpTor.so.)

Source: ashigaru.rs

Custom Node Connection

Custom Node Connection

The wallet can be configured to connect to a user-specified, independently operated Bitcoin node — such as Bitcoin Core, Electrum Server, or other compatible full node software — instead of the wallet provider’s default servers. The key requirement is that the node is clearly independent from the wallet vendor: a third-party node the user controls or trusts.

  • Privacy: Transaction queries go to your own node rather than a third-party server, so no provider learns your wallet addresses or balances.

  • Security: No risk of a provider lying about your balance or the state of the network.

  • Sovereignty: Full independence from wallet provider infrastructure.

  • Requires running and maintaining your own Bitcoin node.
  • More complex initial setup compared to using the provider’s default servers.

Why we list it for this wallet

Connect to your Dojo node and broadcast over the Tor network

Source: ashigaru.rs

Hierarchically Deterministic

Hierarchically Deterministic

All accounts and keys are derived from one masterseed as defined in BIP 32, BIP 39, BIP 44, BIP 49, BIP 84 and BIP 86. While some wallets might use different definitions and not all support SegWit or Taproot, we only consider this feature as given if

  • the backup is a BIP 39 mnemonic
  • the funds are recoverable on a competitor’s product correctly implementing those standards
  • no address reuse
  • simple backup
  • no vendor lock-in

Why we list it for this wallet

Standards based mnemonic secured with a passphrase that can be imported to other wallets

Source: ashigaru.rs

This app is source available: the GPLv3 source is published and tagged for the current release. Its build has not been verified as reproducible yet.

Product page updated by Daniel Andrei R. Garcia

Community Opinions

These comments are contributed by Nostr users.

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Do your own research

In addition to reading our analysis, it is important to do your own checks. Before transferring any bitcoin to your wallet, look up reviews for the wallet you want to use. They should be easy to find. If they aren't, that itself is a reason to be extra careful.

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