Udun Cold T1🔍 Last analysed 11th March 2022 . No source for current release found
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Do your own research!
Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.
The Analysis ¶
We found that this product looks to be very similar to. Like Ellipal, it resembles a mobile phone with a screen display and button.
From the website’s English alternative in the hardware wallet’s page:
Integrated and sealed all-metal body, a cold wallet that safely isolates the network.
We found another page concerning this product on the orginal website.
The hardware wallet is physically isolated, and the private key encryption never touches the Internet. Physical isolation, tamper-proof and tamper-proof, does not require any trust.
It also claims that the wallet supports “33 public chains and thousands of tokens.”
The site asks you to sign in or create an account before you can access the shop page.
Here is a video showcasing this product. At 0:30, the video shows the user making a transaction on the app and then confirming the transaction on the wallet. This is done by scanning the QR code generated by the hardware wallet.
UDUN has a Github account although none of the repositories held any relevant results for the wallet’s firmware. With no information concerning this from the providers, we have to assume that the wallet’s source code is not up for review.
Without public source of the reviewed release available, this product cannot be verified!
As part of our Methodology, we ask:Is the source code publicly available? If not, we tag it No Source!
A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.
Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.
An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.
For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.
If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.
“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.
We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet. You should still prefer actual open source licenses as a competing wallet won’t use the code without giving it careful scrutiny.
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