Wallet Logo

Foundation Passport

latest release: v1.0.7 ( 20th September 2021 ) last analysed  4th October 2021 Reproducible when tested 
1st July 2020

Jump to verdict 

Older reviews (show 1 of 1 reproducible)

Help spread awareness for build reproducibility

Please follow Foundation Passport and thank them for being reproducible  via their Twitter!

Disclaimer

The following Analysis is not a full code review! We plan to make code reviews available in the future but even then it will never be a stamp of approval but rather a list of incidents and questionable coding practice. Nasa sends probes to space that crash due to software bugs despite a huge budget and stringent scrutiny.

Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis 

The provider released a new version. Here we try to reproduce it again:

$ cd /tmp/
$ v=1.0.7
$ buildHash=f141ba05841e206291f63c9229c9b5ed2c45a3e0c9eb4f75ff82d8785feaa595
$ wget https://github.com/Foundation-Devices/passport-firmware/releases/download/v$v/passport-fw-$v.bin
$ sha256sum passport-fw-$v.bin 
265716676ca91bd724ad48b28a6877841b216003b7b03bbfd6e5eee85a5c057a  passport-fw-1.0.7.bin
$ mkdir passport
$ cd passport
$ docker run --rm -it --volume=$(pwd):/work/ ubuntu:18.04 bash -c   "apt update; \
    apt install --yes git python3-pip gcc-arm-none-eabi autotools-dev automake libusb-1.0-0-dev libtool; \
    git clone https://github.com/Foundation-Devices/passport-firmware.git; \
    cd passport-firmware; \
    git checkout v$v; \
    make -C mpy-cross; \
    cd ports/stm32/; \
    make BOARD=Passport; \
    sha256sum build-Passport/firmware.bin;echo $buildHash; \
    mv build-Passport/firmware.bin /work/firmware-passport-v$v.bin; \
    bash"
...
f141ba05841e206291f63c9229c9b5ed2c45a3e0c9eb4f75ff82d8785feaa595  build-Passport/firmware.bin
f141ba05841e206291f63c9229c9b5ed2c45a3e0c9eb4f75ff82d8785feaa595
$ tail -c +2049 ../passport-fw-$v.bin | sha256sum ; \
    sha256sum firmware-passport-v$v.bin; \
    echo $buildHash
f141ba05841e206291f63c9229c9b5ed2c45a3e0c9eb4f75ff82d8785feaa595  -
f141ba05841e206291f63c9229c9b5ed2c45a3e0c9eb4f75ff82d8785feaa595  firmware-passport-v1.0.7.bin
f141ba05841e206291f63c9229c9b5ed2c45a3e0c9eb4f75ff82d8785feaa595

Based on the above, we wrote a little test script for next time:

$ ./scripts/test/hardware/passport.sh 1.0.7 f141ba05841e206291f63c9229c9b5ed2c45a3e0c9eb4f75ff82d8785feaa595
...
265716676ca91bd724ad48b28a6877841b216003b7b03bbfd6e5eee85a5c057a  passport-fw-1.0.7.bin
...
f141ba05841e206291f63c9229c9b5ed2c45a3e0c9eb4f75ff82d8785feaa595  build-Passport/firmware.bin
f141ba05841e206291f63c9229c9b5ed2c45a3e0c9eb4f75ff82d8785feaa595
root@db128e06c0bd:/passport-firmware/ports/stm32# exit
f141ba05841e206291f63c9229c9b5ed2c45a3e0c9eb4f75ff82d8785feaa595  -
f141ba05841e206291f63c9229c9b5ed2c45a3e0c9eb4f75ff82d8785feaa595  firmware-passport-v1.0.7.bin
f141ba05841e206291f63c9229c9b5ed2c45a3e0c9eb4f75ff82d8785feaa595

As with other hardware wallets, we did not check if those clipped bytes are signatures or valid but leave that to actual code reviews: If the code of the hardware wallet does what is claimed, it interprets those bytes as signatures and checks them. In other words, if the public source code is secure, then the link with the binary is established. This product is reproducible.

(ml, lw)

Verdict Explained

The binary provided was reproducible from the code provided.

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

Does the binary we built differ from what we downloaded? If not, we tag it Reproducible 

If we can reproduce the binary we downloaded from the public source code, with all bytes accounted for, we call the product reproducible. This does not mean we audited the code but it’s the precondition to make sure the public code has relevance for the provided binary.

If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, security researchers can see this if they care to look. It also means that inside the company, engineers can verify that the release manager is releasing the product based on code known to all engineers on the team. A scammer would have to work under the potential eyes of security researchers. He would have to take more effort in hiding any exploit.

“Reproducible” does not mean “verified”. There is good reason to believe that security researchers as of today would not detect very blatant backdoors in the public source code before it gets exploited, much less if the attacker takes moderate efforts to hide it. This is especially true for less popular projects.