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Corazon

🔍 Last analysed 3rd December 2021 . No source for current release found

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Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

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The Analysis 

Updated Review 2021-11-25

The provider promotes this product as a luxury version of the Trezor Model T Reproducible Review Old! :

The CORAZON® is our cryptocurrency and bitcoin hardware wallet produced in collaboration with Trezor. It has an outer case machined from aerospace grade titanium and aluminum while built upon the technology of the Trezor Model T.

Private keys can be created offline

Your keys will never leave the device, as it is completely isolated. To make backups easier, Trezor has created the recovery seeds standards (BIP32/39/44), giving you the power to recover your entire wallet by using the 12-word recovery seed. The CORAZON® also features the industry leading Shamir Backup (SLIP39) standard. In the event that your device has been misplaced, our security system allows you peace of mind and a way to act.

Device displays receive address for confirmation

In like manner with a Trezor, the display allows for the confirmation of transactions and a full display of the address.

Interface

Imagine a Trezor hardware wallet with “a solid block of aerospace grade titanium that’s CNC machined to form the body of the CORAZON®”.

Reproducibility

If we are to believe the claims that its firmware is based off the Trezor T, then it should have the same verdict as a Trezor. However, no mention is made about whether they also have the same updates or up to what extent the Corazon® uses the same code.

Verdict

As much as we’re predisposed to believe that it uses exactly the same code as the Trezor T, without links to the GitHub page to Trezor T, detailed specifications about its actual implementation or without having our hands on their device, we really can’t say. Although it does mention that it is open source - because the Trezor T is, we simply cannot believe anything that’s been written on any web page.

Old Review 2021-07-07

This wallet is a Trezor Model T firmware with fancy casing options.

(ml, dg)

Verdict Explained

Without public source of the reviewed release available, this product cannot be verified!

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

Is the source code publicly available? If not, we tag it No Source!

A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.

Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.

An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.

For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.

If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.

“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.

We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet. You should still prefer actual open source licenses as a competing wallet won’t use the code without giving it careful scrutiny.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.