Passed all 8 tests
We check each wallet from its code to the app on your device, asking these questions in order:
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Fake".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:
The bigger wallets often get imitated by scammers that abuse the reputation of the product by imitating its name, logo or both.
Imitating a competitor is a huge red flag and we urge you to not put any money into this product!
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Announced but never delivered" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Announced but never delivered".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Announced but never delivered" and the following would apply:
Some products are promoted with great fund raising, marketing and ICOs, to disappear from one day to the other a week later or they are one-man side projects that get refined for months or even years to still never materialize in an actual product. Regardless, those are projects we consider “vaporware”.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Un-Released" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Un-Released".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Un-Released" and the following would apply:
We focus on products that have the biggest impact if things go wrong and while pre-sales sometimes reach many thousands to buy into promises that never materialize, the damage is limited and there would be little definite to be said about an unreleased product anyway.
If you find a product in this category that was released meanwhile, please contact us to do a proper review!
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Not a wallet".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:
If it’s called “wallet” but is actually only a portfolio tracker, we don’t look any deeper, assuming it is not meant to control funds. What has no funds, can’t lose your coins. It might still leak your financial history!
If you can buy Bitcoins with this app but only into another wallet, it’s not a wallet itself.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:
At this point we only look into wallets that at least also support BTC.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Provided private keys" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Provided private keys".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Provided private keys" and the following would apply:
The best hardware wallet cannot guarantee that the provider deleted the keys if the private keys were put onto the device by them in the first place.
There is no way of knowing if the provider took a copy in the process. If they did, all funds controlled by those devices are potentially also under the control of the provider and could be moved out of the client’s control at any time at the provider’s discretion.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late. The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "No source for current release found".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:
A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.
Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.
An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.
For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.
If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.
“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.
We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet. You should still prefer actual open source licenses as a competing wallet won’t use the code without giving it careful scrutiny.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.Build Verifications
Check your file
Application information
App Description
This app is known for its strong privacy measures. It incorporates coinjoins which it describes as a “collaborative bitcoin transaction” that make it harder to track the owner of coins. It self describes succintly that it is self-custodial, source-available and privacy oriented.
They have a guide on how to build deterministically..
This should be for verification.
Free and Open Source (FOSS)
The wallet’s source code is published under a license approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI) — such as MIT, GPL, Apache, or AGPL — allowing anyone to inspect, modify, and redistribute it. This is a prerequisite for independent security audits and reproducible builds. Licenses that are merely “source available” but not OSI-approved (e.g., those with Commons Clause restrictions, commercial use prohibitions, or other non-free terms) do NOT qualify. Reproducible builds are not sufficient alone.
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Transparency: Anyone can verify what the code does — including whether it contains backdoors, bugs, or privacy-violating behavior.
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Community auditing: More reviewers means vulnerabilities are more likely to be found and fixed.
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Forkability: If the project is abandoned or goes rogue, the community can fork and continue it.
FOSS alone does not guarantee security. The released binary must also be reproducible from the public source to ensure users are actually running the code that was audited.
Why we list it for this wallet
An open-source, non-custodial, privacy-focused Bitcoin wallet for desktop.
Source: GitHub README
CoinJoin / Coin Mixing
Transactions on the Bitcoin network are public and companies like Chainalysis get a very good picture of a user’s past and future spendings knowing just one transaction. Coin mixing — most commonly via CoinJoin, where multiple users collaborate to combine their transactions into one — breaks the heuristics those companies use, giving the user and those they transact with meaningful privacy. On a more fundamental level, transactional privacy is required for fungibility — the concept of all Bitcoins being equal. If transactions can be tracked and attributed to certain activity — gambling, donations to dissidents, medical expenses — users could discriminate against certain sources of payments. Some exchanges already do precisely this.
- Privacy for you
- Fungibility for all
- Some services flag mixed coins as suspicious and may freeze or reject them.
Why we list it for this wallet
Wasabi integrates the WabiSabi Trustless Multi-Party Transaction Protocol, a cutting-edge mechanism for collaborative transactions.
Source: Website
TOR - The Onion Router
TOR is a tool to shield the IP address of communicating parties. When communicating with a node on the TOR network, the communication is also necessarily end to end encrypted but not when communicating to a server on the internet that does neither use TOR nor ssl (https). Modern Androids allow to put apps behind a local TOR node independently of the provider offering TOR features. While this can be desirable to shield one’s IP address, it also might expose unencrypted data to different, probably more aware third parties. It also does not replace more advanced TOR features in which the wallet creates multiple TOR identities for different requests.
- Privacy: TOR shields the client’s IP address and thus his real world location or identity from servers it talks to.
- Speed: TOR means bouncing messages around a bit more with extra encryption. That makes it slower.
Why we list it for this wallet
All your traffic is routed through the Tor Network, ensuring privacy and anonymity.
Source: Website
SPV using compact block filters
Compact block filters as in BIP158 are relatively tiny, probabilistic representation of the full blockchain which tell the client which block contains transactions relevant to specific addresses
Compared to SPV using bloom filters:
- Private: Avoid the leak of the client’s addresses to the full nodes it talks to. If the blocks are downloaded through TOR with new TOR identities for each request from different nodes, the privacy of this mode is almost as good as running a full node. An attacker would have to control a big part of the TOR network to still learn about which addresses are of interes.
- Fast: No re-scan of the full chain needed when importing a wallet. Compared to using an indexing server of the provider, it leaks no data to the provider
Compared to using an indexing server it is slower and more bandwidth is needed.
Why we list it for this wallet
Wasabi uses Compact Filters to synchronize with the blockchain privately.
Source: Website
Advanced UTXO Control
The wallet offers advanced control over which Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXOs) are spent. This goes beyond simple coin selection — it may include the ability to freeze or exclude specific UTXOs (e.g., dusting attacks or tainted coins), label UTXOs, or select inputs manually. The user does not necessarily need full visibility of all UTXOs, but has meaningful control over what gets spent.
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Privacy: Prevent spending from UTXOs linked to unwanted transaction history, or avoid merging coins from different sources in one transaction.
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Dust protection: Mark suspicious incoming transactions as “do not spend” to avoid revealing your wallet’s full UTXO set.
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Fee optimization: Strategically select inputs to manage transaction size and fees.
Why we list it for this wallet
For users who want granular control over their transactions, Wasabi offers advanced Coin Control features. While Wasabi's engine automatically selects the best coins for your transactions, you can manually choose specific coins to use. This allows for precise management of your UTXOs, ensuring that the selection fits your most specific needs.
Source: Website
Transaction Batching
Batching allows to aggregate multiple payments into one Bitcoin transaction.
In Bitcoin, transactions always empty the output of received, prior transactions, so called “unspent transaction outputs” or UTXOs. Without batching, sending to five recipients requires the creation of five transactions with their change outputs - if you don’t have the exact amount you want to send to the recipient, you send “change” to yourself. This change UTXO gets then immediately spent in the next transaction and so on, building a chain of transactions.
- Batching avoids creating intermediate outputs, making the transaction smaller and thus cheaper in terms of mining fees.
- Batching avoids building chains of transactions. If one were to pay more than ten recipients, the network would probably not broadcast the later transactions as only short chains of unconfirmed transactions are being handled by full nodes. Batching fixes that.
Why we list it for this wallet
Batch Payments: Combine multiple payments into a single transaction to save on mining fees and reduce change outputs.
Source: Website
Product page updated by Daniel Andrei R. Garcia
Community Opinions
These comments are contributed by Nostr users.
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Do your own research
In addition to reading our analysis, it is important to do your own checks. Before transferring any bitcoin to your wallet, look up reviews for the wallet you want to use. They should be easy to find. If they aren't, that itself is a reason to be extra careful.