Liana
Our wallet review process
We examine wallets starting at the code level and continue all the way up to the finished app that lives on your device. Provided below is an outline of each of these steps along with security tips for you and general test results.
Released
20th July 2022
Custody
Self-custodial: The user holds the keys
As part of our Methodology, we ask: Does the product allow self-custody?
The answer is "yes". The user has control of their own keys.
Read more
Application build
If you have a binary for a version that doesn't appear on the list, you can dropselect the file here to register it so somebody can verify its reproducibility:
Distribution
Passed all 8 tests
We answered the following questions in this order:
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Fake".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:
The bigger wallets often get imitated by scammers that abuse the reputation of the product by imitating its name, logo or both.
Imitating a competitor is a huge red flag and we urge you to not put any money into this product!
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Announced but never delivered" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Announced but never delivered".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Announced but never delivered" and the following would apply:
Some products are promoted with great fund raising, marketing and ICOs, to disappear from one day to the other a week later or they are one-man side projects that get refined for months or even years to still never materialize in an actual product. Regardless, those are projects we consider “vaporware”.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Un-Released" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Un-Released".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Un-Released" and the following would apply:
We focus on products that have the biggest impact if things go wrong and while pre-sales sometimes reach many thousands to buy into promises that never materialize, the damage is limited and there would be little definite to be said about an unreleased product anyway.
If you find a product in this category that was released meanwhile, please contact us to do a proper review!
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Not a wallet".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:
If it’s called “wallet” but is actually only a portfolio tracker, we don’t look any deeper, assuming it is not meant to control funds. What has no funds, can’t lose your coins. It might still leak your financial history!
If you can buy Bitcoins with this app but only into another wallet, it’s not a wallet itself.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:
At this point we only look into wallets that at least also support BTC.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Provided private keys" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Provided private keys".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "Provided private keys" and the following would apply:
The best hardware wallet cannot guarantee that the provider deleted the keys if the private keys were put onto the device by them in the first place.
There is no way of knowing if the provider took a copy in the process. If they did, all funds controlled by those devices are potentially also under the control of the provider and could be moved out of the client’s control at any time at the provider’s discretion.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "No source for current release found".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer were "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:
A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.
Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.
An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.
For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.
If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.
“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.
We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet. You should still prefer actual open source licenses as a competing wallet won’t use the code without giving it careful scrutiny.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.Application information
The daemon contains the core logic of the wallet. It is both a library (a Rust crate) that exposes a command interface
Source: README
App Description
Liana is a self-custodial Bitcoin wallet where users control all private keys. The wallet implements spending policies combining a primary path for immediate spending and time-delayed recovery paths that activate after specified periods of onchain inactivity. Time-based restrictions are enforced onchain by leveraging timelock capabilities of Bitcoin Script. (Source) The wallet supports both hardware wallet integration and optional software-based “hot signers” for key management. (Source)
The wallet offers three preset configurations during setup. Simple Inheritance uses a primary key for immediate spending and an inheritance key that becomes active after a timelock period. Expanding Multisig uses two primary keys forming a 2-of-2 multisig for immediate spending, and a recovery key that combines with one primary key (2-of-3 multisig) after the timelock expires. Build Your Own allows users to define custom primary and recovery spending policies with user-specified keys and timelock durations. (Source)
Liana offers an optional paid add-on called Safety Net, which adds a custodial recovery key as a final fallback after all user-controlled recovery paths have expired. Safety Net keys are provided by third-party custodians through a marketplace managed by Wizardsardine. The default provider is Hodling (Switzerland), with additional custodians available. Safety Net keys are time-locked and cannot access funds while the wallet remains active. This service is marketed for users transitioning from custodial solutions or requiring insurance against complete key loss. (Source)
Wizardsardine maintains a network of certified partners offering paid professional services for wallet setup and configuration. Partners include 21st Capital (global), Montaigne (France), Bitcoin Brabant (Netherlands/Belgium), CriptoTech (Argentina), and Plano B (Brazil). These services provide personalized guidance for complex wallet configurations, particularly for business users. Additionally, Cryptosteel offers a “Liana Box” starter pack containing hardware setup materials. (Source)
Completing wallet setup with hot signers presents significant practical challenges. After generating the first hot signer, Liana requires additional keys to complete the spending policy configuration. The wallet expects either connected hardware wallets or properly formatted extended public keys (xpubs) with specific derivation paths (m/48'/0'/0'/2') and master fingerprints. Manual xpub entry consistently fails validation even when using correctly formatted descriptors generated by external tools like Sparrow Wallet or Ian Coleman’s BIP39 tool. My initial analysis would show that only liana generated xpubs may be formatted, but my tests were only cursory.
The wallet requires selection of a Bitcoin backend for blockchain connectivity. Four options are available: connecting to an Electrum server, using a local Bitcoin Core node, installing a Liana-managed pruned Bitcoin Core node, or using Liana Connect. Liana Connect is a hosted service operated by Wizardsardine that provides blockchain data access without requiring users to run their own infrastructure, though it involves a privacy trade-off as wallet activity may be observable by the service provider. The service enables features including label and PSBT synchronization across devices. (Source)
Liana is implemented in Rust with two main components: a daemon managing wallet state and transaction logic, and a graphical interface built using the iced library for Linux, macOS, and Windows. The daemon exposes a JSONRPC API via Unix Domain Socket and integrates with hardware wallets through HWI (Hardware Wallet Interface). Source code is available under the BSD 3-Clause License. (Source)
This desktop program is source-available and for verification.
You may have more than one key in either the primary or the recovery path (multisig).
Source: GitHub README
The wallet requires selection of a Bitcoin backend for blockchain connectivity. Four options are available: connecting to an Electrum server, using a local Bitcoin Core node, installing a Liana-managed pruned Bitcoin Core node, or using Liana Connect.
Source: App Description
connecting to an Electrum server, using a local Bitcoin Core node, installing a Liana-managed pruned Bitcoin Core node, or using Liana Connect.
Source: App Description
Released under the BSD 3-Clause Licence. See the LICENCE file.
BSD 3-Clause is an OSI-approved FOSS license. The App Description says 'source-available' but the README and License section confirm BSD 3-Clause with no Commons Clause restriction noted.
Source: GitHub README
Create singlesig and multisig wallets or make an expanding multisig.
Insufficient — omitting this one.
Source: Website
Product page updated by Daniel Andrei R. Garcia
Do your own research
In addition to reading our analysis, it is important to do your own checks. Before transferring any bitcoin to your wallet, look up reviews for the wallet you want to use. They should be easy to find. If they aren't, that itself is a reason to be extra careful.