Wallet Logo

wallet.io Pro

latest release: 1.2.9 ( 6th August 2021 ) last analysed  19th October 2021 No source for current release found 
17th September 2019

Jump to verdict 

Help spread awareness for build reproducibility

Please help us spread the word discussing transparency with wallet.io Pro  via their Twitter!

Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis 

(Analysis from Android review)

Note: This is the PRO version for:

wallet.io—Multi-Chain (BTC, ETH, EOS, Cosmos …) No Source! 

App Description

  • One Stop digital asset management
  • Two secure asset management solutions
  • Manage assets with partners
  • Institutional, Multi-signature, Numerous Currencies
  • Team Property, Team Confirmation

The Site

Group multisig

  • Suitable for multiple parties’ co-management. Avoid assets loss caused by single private key missing. Offer a better solution to multiple parties funding co-managements.
  • ‘m-of-n’ signatures. Set ‘n’ total private keys and requires ‘m’ signatures in authorizing a transaction.

The App

We downloaded the app. Our user credentials are the same with the other wallet.io app.

After sign-in, we are presented with two options:

  • Group multisig wallet
  • Individual multisig wallet

We opted for the individual multisig wallet.

We then filled up the following fields:

  • Wallet name
  • Description
  • Private key generation:
    • Local
    • Wallet.io hardware
  • Safe-keeping of the third private key
    • Authority
    • Yourself

Contact

We were able to locate their github, but as of this moment, it seems to be outdated, with only six commits in the past year. Additionally, no repositories were related to wallet.io’s mobile app.

Verdict

This app is self-custodial, but the source code is not verifiable.

(dg)

Verdict Explained

Without public source of the reviewed release available, this product cannot be verified!

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

Is the source code publicly available? If not, we tag it No Source! 

A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.

Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.

An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.

For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.

If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.

“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.

We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.