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Green: Bitcoin Wallet

latest release: 3.5.9 last analysed  19th December 2020
Not reproducible from the source provided
3.9 ★★★★★
22nd March 2019

Published:

Our last analysis is based on data found in their App Store description.
details below 

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Please help us spread the word, asking Green: Bitcoin Wallet to support reproducible builds  via their Twitter!

Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis

The description in the App Store is not explicit about the app being non-custodial and on their website we read:

Unmatched Security
Our innovative multisignature model uses dual private keys - one held by the user, and one by our servers. This allows us to enforce Two-Factor Authentication to protect your funds, while timelock smart contracts guarantee that users always retain full control of their coins.

This model never puts the provider in a position of being able to spend the user’s coins but the user cannot spend the coins neither until a predefined time elapsed, should their servers not cooperate.

While not uncontroversial, this is not custodial but so far nobody reproduced the build, so claims about security are not verifiable.

(lw)

Verdict Explained

Not reproducible from the source provided

The app provider also shares code but we could so far not verify that the published code matches the published app!

This verdict means that the provider did share some source code but that we could not verify that this source code matches the released app. This might be due to the source being released later than the app or due to the provided instructions on how to compile the app not being sufficient or due to the provider excluding parts from the public source code. In any case, the result is a discrepancy between the app we can create and the app we can find on GooglePlay and any discrepancy might leak your backup to the server on purpose or by accident.

As we cannot verify that the source provided is the source the app was compiled from, this category is only slightly better than closed source but for now we have hope projects come around and fix verifiability issues.

The app cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The app might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.