Wallet Logo

PlasmaPay - DeFi Crypto Wallet

App Store
Latest Release: v v2.1.3 20th December 2020

Our wallet review process

We examine wallets starting at the code level and continue all the way up to the finished app that lives on your device. Provided below is an outline of each of these steps along with security tips for you and general test results.

Custody

Work In Progress

Also This product went out of business ... or so. Read the analysis for details.

As part of our Methodology, we ask: Is the product self-custodial?

However, we did not run this test because we failed at a preceding test.
Read more

Source code

Private

Released

19th August 2019

Application build

We still have to analyze this product.

See test result
Tested 17th November 2021

Distribution

App Store
5/5 stars

Platform notes

On the Apple App Store, there are many apps that have Bitcoin in their name or description but don’t allow the user to use Bitcoin or they don’t look like Bitcoin wallets but turn out to be. We run our tests and document our findings.

WalletScrutiny started out looking only into Android. This is because mobile wallets are the most used wallets, and Android is the most used among mobile wallets, but looking into iPhone wallets was high on the list from the start.

For Android, the reproducing build process is relatively clear; some apps did this before we started the project. For iPhone, this was not the case. As a result, iPhone app reproducibility was an open question.

We asked around. Several years passed. Nobody could reproduce any iPhone app.

At this point, we shift the burden of proof onto the providers (or Apple). If you want people to trust your app (or platform), explain how it can be audited. We will move on in the meantime and list iPhone apps with an empty reproducible section until then.

Passed 0 of 9 tests

We answered the following questions in this order:
We did not yet perform any tests.

Is this product the original?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Fake".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:

The bigger wallets often get imitated by scammers that abuse the reputation of the product by imitating its name, logo or both.

Imitating a competitor is a huge red flag and we urge you to not put any money into this product!

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is it a wallet?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Not a wallet".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:

If it’s called “wallet” but is actually only a portfolio tracker, we don’t look any deeper, assuming it is not meant to control funds. What has no funds, can’t lose your coins. It might still leak your financial history!

If you can buy Bitcoins with this app but only into another wallet, it’s not a wallet itself.

Is it for bitcoins?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:

At this point we only look into wallets that at least also support BTC.

Can it send and receive bitcoins?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins" and the following would apply:

If it is for holding BTC but you can’t actually send or receive them with this product then it doesn’t function like a wallet for BTC but you might still be using it to hold your bitcoins with the intention to convert back to fiat when you “cash out”.

All products in this category are custodial and thus funds are at the mercy of the provider.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is the product self-custodial?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys" and the following would apply:

A custodial service is a service where the funds are held by a third party like the provider. The custodial service can at any point steal all the funds of all the users at their discretion. Our investigations stop there.

Some services might claim their setup is super secure, that they don’t actually have access to the funds, or that the access is shared between multiple parties. For our evaluation of it being a wallet, these details are irrelevant. They might be a trustworthy Bitcoin bank and they might be a better fit for certain users than being your own bank but our investigation still stops there as we are only interested in wallets.

Products that claim to be non-custodial but feature custodial accounts without very clearly marking those as custodial are also considered “custodial” as a whole to avoid misguiding users that follow our assessment.

This verdict means that the provider might or might not publish source code and maybe it is even possible to reproduce the build from the source code but as it is custodial, the provider already has control over the funds, so it is not a wallet where you would be in exclusive control of your funds.

We have to acknowledge that a huge majority of Bitcoiners are currently using custodial Bitcoin banks. If you do, please:

  • Do your own research if the provider is trust-worthy!
  • Check if you know at least enough about them so you can sue them when you have to!
  • Check if the provider is under a jurisdiction that will allow them to release your funds when you need them?
  • Check if the provider is taking security measures proportional to the amount of funds secured? If they have a million users and don’t use cold storage, that hot wallet is a million times more valuable for hackers to attack. A million times more effort will be taken by hackers to infiltrate their security systems.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is the source code publicly available?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "No source for current release found".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:

A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.

Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.

An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.

For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.

If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.

“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.

We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet. You should still prefer actual open source licenses as a competing wallet won’t use the code without giving it careful scrutiny.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is the decompiled binary legible?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Obfuscated" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Obfuscated".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Obfuscated" and the following would apply:

When compiling source code to binary, usually a lot of meta information is retained. A variable storing a masterseed would usually still be called masterseed, so an auditor could inspect what happens to the masterseed. Does it get sent to some server? But obfuscation would rename it for example to _t12, making it harder to find what the product is doing with the masterseed.

In benign cases, code symbols are replaced by short strings to make the binary smaller but for the sake of transparency this should not be done for non-reproducible Bitcoin wallets. (Reproducible wallets could obfuscate the binary for size improvements as the reproducibility would assure the link between code and binary.)

Especially in the public source cases, obfuscation is a red flag. If the code is public, why obfuscate it?

As obfuscation is such a red flag when looking for transparency, we do also sometimes inspect the binaries of closed source apps.

As looking for code obfuscation is a more involved task, we do not inspect many apps but if we see other red flags, we might test this to then put the product into this red-flag category.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Can the product be built from the source provided?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Failed to build from source provided!" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Failed to build from source provided!".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Failed to build from source provided!" and the following would apply:

Published code doesn’t help much if the app fails to compile.

We try to compile the published source code using the published build instructions into a binary. If that fails, we might try to work around issues but if we consistently fail to build the app, we give it this verdict and open an issue in the issue tracker of the provider to hopefully verify their app later.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Does the published binary match the published source code?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Not reproducible from source provided" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Not reproducible from source provided".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Not reproducible from source provided" and the following would apply:

Published code doesn’t help much if it is not what the published binary was built from. That is why we try to reproduce the binary. We

  1. obtain the binary from the provider
  2. compile the published source code using the published build instructions into a binary
  3. compare the two binaries
  4. we might spend some time working around issues that are easy to work around

If this fails, we might search if other revisions match or if we can deduct the source of the mismatch but generally consider it on the provider to provide the correct source code and build instructions to reproduce the build, so we usually open a ticket in their code repository.

In any case, the result is a discrepancy between the binary we can create and the binary we can find for download and any discrepancy might leak your backup to the server on purpose or by accident.

As we cannot verify that the source provided is the source the binary was compiled from, this category is only slightly better than closed source but for now we have hope projects come around and fix verifiability issues.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.

Application build test result

(Analysis from Android review)

App Description

Looking for the perfect digital currency wallet? We worked hard for you to create the most secure and user-friendly app — PlasmaPay. It’s not just a Wallet, it’s the full Payment and Investment platform. Buy Bitcoin, Ethereum and other cryptocurrencies with credit or debit card directly from your wallet.

  • Biometrically authenticate with Touch ID or Face ID
  • Only you have access to your private keys and your crypto
  • Paper private key
  • Additional password for protection wallet
  • PCI DSS compliant
  • Protect your app with 4-digit-PIN
  • Advanced Two-Factor Authentication
  • Backup key to your local mobile storage

Critical Reviews

Multiple users say that they have errors with this app. This dates back to January 2020.

Ashish Nath
★☆☆☆☆ January 17, 2020
No way to create usd wallet always showing error

63 Grams
★☆☆☆☆ January 22, 2021
Always an error

Granit Lushaku
★☆☆☆☆ November 24, 2020
Can’t sign up error on capcha

Andrew Herkenhoff
★☆☆☆☆ July 9, 2021
This app does not appear to be functional. I can not activate my account, that is assuming it actually loads. Seemed like it had promise but it just doesn’t work.

Private Keys are mentioned in the Terms of Use

As a bitcoin wallet, the Service enables you to interface with the bitcoin network to view and transmit information about a public cryptographic key commonly referred to as a bitcoin address – sometimes referred to herein as a “bitcoin account”. To transmit information about a bitcoin account to the bitcoin network, the private key(s) corresponding with the bitcoin account is required. The Service requires three private cryptographic keys to be associated with each Bitcoin or Plasma wallet and PlasmaPay controls only one of these private keys. Two of the three private keys associated with a bitcoin wallet are needed to effect a “transfer” of bitcoin from a bitcoin account (i.e., disassociate bitcoin from one bitcoin wallet and re-associate bitcoin with another bitcoin wallet). Once the bitcoin network recognizes the information you send from the Service and validates it, the information is broadcasted to other individuals and companies in the bitcoin network and the Service cannot be used by you to cancel or reverse bitcoin-to-bitcoin transactions.

Section 5.1 PlasmaPay Wallets All registered users may establish and fund only one PlasmaPay Wallet to facilitate transactions on the PlasmaPay platform. You are the only one owner of the funds of your PlasmaPay Wallet. PlasmaPay does not aggregate and hold the digital assets of your or other users’ PlasmaPay Wallet in a dedicated custodial account. All funds stored in the PlasmaPay wallet are owned and controlled only by the user through the use of a private key.

Security Measures

Section 6 of its Security Policy mentions that user funds are stored in cold-storage:

The purpose of the PlasmaPay’s security framework is to ensure that there are strict measures and practices in place to protect customer assets against any eventualities and threats. The majority of customer digital assets (e.g., bitcoin) are held in our offline wallet systems (Cold storage) as well as with the industry’s most reputable liquidity providers and crypto custodians. We are conducting periodical stress tests and security audits to ensure compliance with the strictest security standards.

Section 6.1 Digital Asset security

Digital asset security is supported by the following solutions:

  • Cold Storage. Offline wallet system (Cold storage) provides an important security measure against hacking, theft or loss. Asset transfers from the Cold storage require actions of multiple employees. All private keys are stored in safe deposit boxes and vaults distributed geographically.
  • Hot Wallets. The hot wallet keys are generated, stored and managed in HSM (hardware security modules) serviced by Azure Key Vault. HSM’s hardware has been evaluated according to FIPS publication 140-2 with a rating of Level 2.

Source Code

No mention has been made referring to Plasma Pay as an open source project. What it refers to in its legal-documentation is the open source nature of the underlying protocols that govern the cryptocurrencies that function within its software.

Verdict

We were not able to log in via the Android app. So we signed up via the web app. They asked for our email, phone number and name. Then they asked to verify the email address. We then logged in and created a Bitcoin wallet. We were asked to create a wallet password. Afterwards, the PDF key card was then automatically downloaded. The PDF file had an Activation Code, a QR code and a 12-word mnemonic phrase. We believe that the QR code is the private key.

Even though the private key is provided in a PDF file by way of a web download, we believe that this is still a custodial service.

Add to the fact that there is no mention of sharing their code on their website, and no relevant or related code on Github, we believe this project is not open source.

Even though they claim to provide the private keys, their clause on account termination, closure and suspension give us pause as to what extent they can control the user’s funds.

We included a Section 6.7 here for reference:

If PlasmaPay suspends or closes your account, or terminates your use of PlasmaPay Services for any reason, we will provide you with notice of our actions unless a court order or other legal process prohibits PlasmaPay from providing you with such notice. You acknowledge that PlasmaPay’s decision to take certain actions, including limiting access to, suspending, or closing your account, may be based on confidential criteria that are essential to PlasmaPay’s risk management and security protocols. You agree that PlasmaPay is under no obligation to disclose the details of its risk management and security procedures to you. You will be permitted to transfer Digital Currency or funds associated with your Digital Currency Wallet and/or your PlasmaPay Wallet for ninety (90) days after Account deactivation or cancellation unless such transfer is otherwise prohibited

The key phrase “unless such transfer is otherwise prohibited” make us believe that Plasmapay can freeze the user’s account on legal grounds even though they claim that only the user controls the funds. This makes it permissioned.

It is hard to conclude this app as a custodial offering as it provides the keys, meaning that the user has access to his funds. Our findings in their fine-print could also be interpreted as their wallet not facilitating the control of private keys but them not having the private keys neither.

But at the moment, the app itself is not functional. As there are reviews dating back from January reporting errors, we conclude that this “wallet” is defunct.

Tests performed by Daniel Andrei R. Garcia

Do your own research

In addition to reading our analysis, it is important to do your own checks. Before transferring any bitcoin to your wallet, look up reviews for the wallet you want to use. They should be easy to find. If they aren't, that itself is a reason to be extra careful.