Wallet Logo

BitPay - Bitcoin Wallet & Card

App Store
Latest Release: 14.18.1 18th March 2024

Our wallet review process

We examine wallets starting at the code level and continue all the way up to the finished app that lives on your device. Provided below is an outline of each of these steps along with security tips for you and general test results.

Developer

BitPay, Inc.

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Custody

Self-custodial: The user holds the keys

As part of our Methodology, we ask: Is the product self-custodial?

The answer is "yes". The user has control of their own keys.
Read more

Source code

Public on github

Released

24th October 2016

Application build

We encountered a build error while compiling from source code!
See the last Issue we created.

See test result
Tested 13th March 2023

Distribution

App Store
4.3/5 stars

Platform notes

On the Apple App Store, there are many apps that have Bitcoin in their name or description but don’t allow the user to use Bitcoin or they don’t look like Bitcoin wallets but turn out to be. We run our tests and document our findings.

WalletScrutiny started out looking only into Android. This is because mobile wallets are the most used wallets, and Android is the most used among mobile wallets, but looking into iPhone wallets was high on the list from the start.

For Android, the reproducing build process is relatively clear; some apps did this before we started the project. For iPhone, this was not the case. As a result, iPhone app reproducibility was an open question.

We asked around. Several years passed. Nobody could reproduce any iPhone app.

At this point, we shift the burden of proof onto the providers (or Apple). If you want people to trust your app (or platform), explain how it can be audited. We will move on in the meantime and list iPhone apps with an empty reproducible section until then.

Passed 7 of 9 tests

We answered the following questions in this order:
We stopped asking questions after we encountered a failed answer.

Is this product the original?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Fake".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:

The bigger wallets often get imitated by scammers that abuse the reputation of the product by imitating its name, logo or both.

Imitating a competitor is a huge red flag and we urge you to not put any money into this product!

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is it a wallet?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Not a wallet".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:

If it’s called “wallet” but is actually only a portfolio tracker, we don’t look any deeper, assuming it is not meant to control funds. What has no funds, can’t lose your coins. It might still leak your financial history!

If you can buy Bitcoins with this app but only into another wallet, it’s not a wallet itself.

Is it for bitcoins?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:

At this point we only look into wallets that at least also support BTC.

Can it send and receive bitcoins?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins" and the following would apply:

If it is for holding BTC but you can’t actually send or receive them with this product then it doesn’t function like a wallet for BTC but you might still be using it to hold your bitcoins with the intention to convert back to fiat when you “cash out”.

All products in this category are custodial and thus funds are at the mercy of the provider.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is the product self-custodial?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys" and the following would apply:

A custodial service is a service where the funds are held by a third party like the provider. The custodial service can at any point steal all the funds of all the users at their discretion. Our investigations stop there.

Some services might claim their setup is super secure, that they don’t actually have access to the funds, or that the access is shared between multiple parties. For our evaluation of it being a wallet, these details are irrelevant. They might be a trustworthy Bitcoin bank and they might be a better fit for certain users than being your own bank but our investigation still stops there as we are only interested in wallets.

Products that claim to be non-custodial but feature custodial accounts without very clearly marking those as custodial are also considered “custodial” as a whole to avoid misguiding users that follow our assessment.

This verdict means that the provider might or might not publish source code and maybe it is even possible to reproduce the build from the source code but as it is custodial, the provider already has control over the funds, so it is not a wallet where you would be in exclusive control of your funds.

We have to acknowledge that a huge majority of Bitcoiners are currently using custodial Bitcoin banks. If you do, please:

  • Do your own research if the provider is trust-worthy!
  • Check if you know at least enough about them so you can sue them when you have to!
  • Check if the provider is under a jurisdiction that will allow them to release your funds when you need them?
  • Check if the provider is taking security measures proportional to the amount of funds secured? If they have a million users and don’t use cold storage, that hot wallet is a million times more valuable for hackers to attack. A million times more effort will be taken by hackers to infiltrate their security systems.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is the source code publicly available?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "No source for current release found".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:

A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.

Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.

An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.

For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.

If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.

“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.

We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet. You should still prefer actual open source licenses as a competing wallet won’t use the code without giving it careful scrutiny.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is the decompiled binary legible?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Obfuscated" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Obfuscated".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Obfuscated" and the following would apply:

When compiling source code to binary, usually a lot of meta information is retained. A variable storing a masterseed would usually still be called masterseed, so an auditor could inspect what happens to the masterseed. Does it get sent to some server? But obfuscation would rename it for example to _t12, making it harder to find what the product is doing with the masterseed.

In benign cases, code symbols are replaced by short strings to make the binary smaller but for the sake of transparency this should not be done for non-reproducible Bitcoin wallets. (Reproducible wallets could obfuscate the binary for size improvements as the reproducibility would assure the link between code and binary.)

Especially in the public source cases, obfuscation is a red flag. If the code is public, why obfuscate it?

As obfuscation is such a red flag when looking for transparency, we do also sometimes inspect the binaries of closed source apps.

As looking for code obfuscation is a more involved task, we do not inspect many apps but if we see other red flags, we might test this to then put the product into this red-flag category.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Can the product be built from the source provided?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Failed to build from source provided!" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Failed to build from source provided!".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Failed to build from source provided!" and the following would apply:

Published code doesn’t help much if the app fails to compile.

We try to compile the published source code using the published build instructions into a binary. If that fails, we might try to work around issues but if we consistently fail to build the app, we give it this verdict and open an issue in the issue tracker of the provider to hopefully verify their app later.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Does the published binary match the published source code?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Not reproducible from source provided" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Not reproducible from source provided".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Not reproducible from source provided" and the following would apply:

Published code doesn’t help much if it is not what the published binary was built from. That is why we try to reproduce the binary. We

  1. obtain the binary from the provider
  2. compile the published source code using the published build instructions into a binary
  3. compare the two binaries
  4. we might spend some time working around issues that are easy to work around

If this fails, we might search if other revisions match or if we can deduct the source of the mismatch but generally consider it on the provider to provide the correct source code and build instructions to reproduce the build, so we usually open a ticket in their code repository.

In any case, the result is a discrepancy between the binary we can create and the binary we can find for download and any discrepancy might leak your backup to the server on purpose or by accident.

As we cannot verify that the source provided is the source the binary was compiled from, this category is only slightly better than closed source but for now we have hope projects come around and fix verifiability issues.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
BitPay: Secure Crypto Wallet  Google Play

Application build test result

(Analysis from Android review)

Update 2023-03-12: The source code of the last review was missing and was provided later on. That was version 12.6.4. Currently Google Play gives us version 14.10.1 and on GitHub … the 14.10.1 release was published one day prior. Time to take a deeper look.

They moved to a new repository. Hopefully that resolves the issue that didn’t allow us to compile the app earlier. As the respective bug is still open albeit on the old repository, hopes are not too high.

On the new repo there is no build instructions. Only development instructions on how to deploy the app to a locally connected device.

The old repo does not hint at being obsolete or even mention the existance of the new one.

Their website doesn’t link to any repository but to the owner of both repos. I opened an issue here.

So … let’s try to compile using prior attempts by Emanuel …

$ podman build --pull --rm -t bitpay_build_apk_new -f scripts/test/container/com.bitpay.wallet_v14.10.1

While compiling for the n-th time the container file, here are some issues I ran into:

  • wallet is now bitpay-app. Of course I had missed to replace it in all lines.
  • once the original build file worked, adding that other run command … missed a rename again.
  • node 10 was not high enough. Node > 12 please.
  • node 14 container decided not to like the github.com certificate
  • node 16.19.1 … doesn’t like github.com certificate neither. What was it Emanuel did in such a case? … This old StackOverflow isn’t conclusive. Do I really have to add ca-certificates “manually”? Yeah, it did the trick …
  • warning Resolution field "@jest/create-cache-key-function@26.5.0" is incompatible with requested version "@jest/create-cache-key-function@^27.0.1" sounds like a problem. Let’s see …
  • ERROR: JAVA_HOME is not set and no 'java' command could be found in your PATH. Fair enough. Guess that’s missing …
  • error Failed to install the app. … yeah, we don’t want to install it. Did I guess wrong? Wasn’t android:release the right command? Let’s see if build:android:release works better …
  • A problem occurred configuring project ':react-native-user-agent'.
> java.util.concurrent.ExecutionException: org.gradle.api.UncheckedIOException: Failed to create receipt for instrumented classpath file '92608205640f72a123b87543424bbbc3/builder-test-api-3.5.3.jar'.

    … time to ask Google …

  • Somehow Error: EMFILE: too many open files, scandir 'node_modules/scheduler/umd' cropped up again. Upping limits further …
  • Next up we have … Could not find com.google.android.gms:play-services-tapandpay:18.2.0.. Google? Any suggestions?
FAILURE: Build failed with an exception.

* What went wrong:
Could not determine the dependencies of task ':app:lintVitalRelease'.
> Could not resolve all artifacts for configuration ':app:debugCompileClasspath'.
   > Could not find com.google.android.gms:play-services-tapandpay:18.2.0.
     Required by:
         project :app

Others ran into this, too and it seams the app can only be compiled by play-services-tapandpay “authorized partners”.

That’s how much effort we put into this for now. BitPay: Secure Crypto Wallet is currently not verifiable.

Older Review

Update 2022-11-02: The two issues about not being able to build this product did not get any attention from the provider but what’s sadly even worse: The version 14.7.4 has no published source code. This product is not verifiable.

Updated Review

Emanuel tried to build the version: 12.6.4 and check the build’s reproducibility or if not, see the diff.

Containerfile used:

FROM ubuntu:rolling

RUN set -ex; \
    mkdir -p /usr/share/man/man1/; \
    apt-get update; \
    DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install --yes -o APT::Install-Suggests=false --no-install-recommends \
        npm \
        git \
        wget \
        unzip \
        gradle \
        python2 \
        make \
        g++ \        
        openjdk-8-jdk ; \
    rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*; \
    useradd -ms /bin/bash appuser;

USER appuser

ENV ANDROID_SDK_ROOT="/home/appuser/app/sdk" \
    ANDROID_HOME="/home/appuser/app/sdk" \
    NODE_ENV="development"

RUN set -ex; \
    mkdir -p "/home/appuser/app/sdk/licenses" "/home/appuser/app/bitpay/"; \
    printf "\n24333f8a63b6825ea9c5514f83c2829b004d1fee" > "/home/appuser/app/sdk/licenses/android-sdk-license"; \
    cd /home/appuser/app/bitpay/; \
    wget https://github.com/bitpay/wallet/archive/refs/tags/v12.6.4.zip; \
    unzip v12.6.4.zip; \
    git clone https://github.com/bitpay/wallet/; \
    cd /home/appuser/app/bitpay/wallet-12.6.4;

Compiled with:

podman build --pull --rm -t bitpay_build_apk_new -f Containerfile

Run with:

podman run --rm --name bitpay_build_apk -ti bitpay_build_apk

in container running npm install or npm ci or npm audit fix fails with the error:

npm ERR! ../src/create_string.cpp:17:37: error: no matching function for call to 'v8::String::Utf8Value::Utf8Value(v8::Local<v8::Value>&)'
npm ERR!    17 |   v8::String::Utf8Value string(value);
npm ERR!       |                                     ^
npm ERR! In file included from /home/appuser/.node-gyp/12.21.0/include/node/node.h:67,
npm ERR!                  from ../../nan/nan.h:56,
npm ERR!                  from ../src/create_string.cpp:1:
npm ERR! /home/appuser/.node-gyp/12.21.0/include/node/v8.h:3135:5: note: candidate: 'v8::String::Utf8Value::Utf8Value(v8::Isolate*, v8::Local<v8::Value>)'
npm ERR!  3135 |     Utf8Value(Isolate* isolate, Local<v8::Value> obj);
npm ERR!       |     ^~~~~~~~~
npm ERR! /home/appuser/.node-gyp/12.21.0/include/node/v8.h:3135:5: note:   candidate expects 2 arguments, 1 provided
npm ERR! make: *** [binding.target.mk:129: Release/obj.target/binding/src/create_string.o] Error 1
npm ERR! gyp ERR! build error 
npm ERR! gyp ERR! stack Error: `make` failed with exit code: 2
npm ERR! gyp ERR! stack     at ChildProcess.onExit (/home/appuser/app/bitpay/wallet-12.6.4/node_modules/node-gyp/lib/build.js:262:23)
npm ERR! gyp ERR! stack     at ChildProcess.emit (events.js:314:20)
npm ERR! gyp ERR! stack     at Process.ChildProcess._handle.onexit (internal/child_process.js:276:12)
npm ERR! gyp ERR! System Linux 5.12.15-300.fc34.x86_64
npm ERR! gyp ERR! command "/usr/bin/node" "/home/appuser/app/bitpay/wallet-12.6.4/node_modules/node-gyp/bin/node-gyp.js" "rebuild" "--verbose" "--libsass_ext=" "--libsass_cflags=" "--libsass_ldflags=" "--libsass_library="
npm ERR! gyp ERR! cwd /home/appuser/app/bitpay/wallet-12.6.4/node_modules/node-sass
npm ERR! gyp ERR! node -v v12.21.0
npm ERR! gyp ERR! node-gyp -v v3.8.0
npm ERR! gyp ERR! not ok 
npm ERR! Build failed with error code: 1

This app has failed to build. Link to the Github thread.

Old Review 2019-11-29

BitPay – Secure Bitcoin Wallet links to its source code on their Google Play app description.

Bitpay is the first wallet here that uses Angular and we are not most familiar with it. Our standard being “easily reproducible” means it is on the wallet provider to also provide clear instructions on how to build the app and the most straight forward way to well define the environment would be to explain it in code, using a Docker containers for example.

Bitpay does not advertise reproducibility for their builds and neither describes well how to build the app at all and so we are stuck after running npm install with this error message:

npm ERR! code ELIFECYCLE
npm ERR! errno 1
npm ERR! secp256k1@1.1.5 install: `node-gyp rebuild`
npm ERR! Exit status 1
npm ERR!
npm ERR! Failed at the secp256k1@1.1.5 install script.
npm ERR! This is probably not a problem with npm. There is likely additional logging output above.

npm ERR! A complete log of this run can be found in:
npm ERR!     /home/name/.npm/_logs/2019-11-09T21_53_17_873Z-debug.log
[ERROR] An error occurred while running subprocess cordova.

        cordova platform add android --save exited with exit code 1.

        Re-running this command with the --verbose flag may provide more information.
npm ERR! code ELIFECYCLE
npm ERR! errno 1
npm ERR! copay@7.1.1 prepare:copay: `npm run clean && npm run apply:copay && ionic cordova platform add ios; ionic cordova platform add android && npm run fix:fcm`
npm ERR! Exit status 1
npm ERR!
npm ERR! Failed at the copay@7.1.1 prepare:copay script.
npm ERR! This is probably not a problem with npm. There is likely additional logging output above.

npm ERR! A complete log of this run can be found in:
npm ERR!     /home/name/.npm/_logs/2019-11-09T21_53_17_974Z-debug.log

which as it turns out, others are struggling with, too without much help from the provider, who closed the issue without helping.

At this point we realize, the version on Google Play, 7.1.7 is nowhere to be found in their git repository:

$ git log --grep="7.1.7"
$ git tag | grep "7.1.7"
$

Therefore for now our verdict is that Copay cannot be easily verified.

We did give compilation another try using a Cordova Docker we found here. Generally we would love to see projects share Dockerfiles with which their build instructions just worked but for now, here is what we tried:

$ docker pull beevelop/cordova:latest
me@home:~/StudioProjects/copay$ docker run --name=cordova -v /home/me/StudioProjects/copay:/mnt -it beevelop/cordova bash
root@3eae2071ceaf:/tmp# cd /mnt/
root@3eae2071ceaf:/mnt# npm install

> secp256k1@1.1.5 install /mnt/node_modules/secp256k1
> node-gyp rebuild

gyp ERR! configure error
gyp ERR! stack Error: Can't find Python executable "python", you can set the PYTHON env variable.
...
root@3eae2071ceaf:/mnt# apt update ; apt install python -y
root@3eae2071ceaf:/mnt# npm install

> secp256k1@1.1.5 install /mnt/node_modules/secp256k1
> node-gyp rebuild

gyp ERR! build error
gyp ERR! stack Error: not found: make
...
root@3eae2071ceaf:/mnt# apt install make
root@3eae2071ceaf:/mnt# npm install

> secp256k1@1.1.5 install /mnt/node_modules/secp256k1
> node-gyp rebuild

make: Entering directory '/mnt/node_modules/secp256k1/build'
  CXX(target) Release/obj.target/secp256k1/functions.o
make: g++: Command not found
...
root@3eae2071ceaf:/mnt# apt install g++
root@3eae2071ceaf:/mnt# npm install
...
npm WARN lifecycle copay@8.0.4~postinstall: cannot run in wd copay@8.0.4 npm run env:dev && npm run prompt (wd=/mnt)
npm WARN @angular-devkit/build-webpack@0.12.4 requires a peer of webpack@^4.6.0 but none is installed. You must install peer dependencies yourself.
npm WARN @ngtools/webpack@7.2.4 requires a peer of webpack@^4.0.0 but none is installed. You must install peer dependencies yourself.
npm WARN @zxing/ngx-scanner@1.2.1 requires a peer of rxjs@^6.2.0 but none is installed. You must install peer dependencies yourself.
npm WARN awesome-typescript-loader@5.2.1 requires a peer of typescript@^2.7 || ^3 but none is installed. You must install peer dependencies yourself.
npm WARN circular-dependency-plugin@5.0.2 requires a peer of webpack@>=4.0.1 but none is installed. You must install peer dependencies yourself.
npm WARN mini-css-extract-plugin@0.8.0 requires a peer of webpack@^4.4.0 but none is installed. You must install peer dependencies yourself.
npm WARN ngx-barcode@0.2.4 requires a peer of @angular/core@^4.0.0 but none is installed. You must install peer dependencies yourself.
npm WARN terser-webpack-plugin@1.2.1 requires a peer of webpack@^4.0.0 but none is installed. You must install peer dependencies yourself.
npm WARN webpack-dev-middleware@3.4.0 requires a peer of webpack@^4.0.0 but none is installed. You must install peer dependencies yourself.
npm WARN webpack-dev-server@3.1.14 requires a peer of webpack@^4.0.0 but none is installed. You must install peer dependencies yourself.
npm WARN optional SKIPPING OPTIONAL DEPENDENCY: fsevents@1.2.9 (node_modules/fsevents):
npm WARN notsup SKIPPING OPTIONAL DEPENDENCY: Unsupported platform for fsevents@1.2.9: wanted {"os":"darwin","arch":"any"} (current: {"os":"linux","arch":"x64"})

added 3 packages from 10 contributors and audited 76060 packages in 18.811s
found 17 vulnerabilities (7 low, 1 moderate, 9 high)
  run `npm audit fix` to fix them, or `npm audit` for details
root@3eae2071ceaf:/mnt# npm run clean-all
root@3eae2071ceaf:/mnt# npm install
root@3eae2071ceaf:/mnt# npm run apply:copay
root@3eae2071ceaf:/mnt# npm run prepare:copay
root@3eae2071ceaf:/mnt# npm run final:android
...
Checking the license for package Android SDK Platform 27 in /opt/android/licenses
Warning: License for package Android SDK Platform 27 not accepted.

FAILURE: Build failed with an exception.

* What went wrong:
A problem occurred configuring project ':CordovaLib'.
> You have not accepted the license agreements of the following SDK components:
  [Android SDK Platform 27].
root@3eae2071ceaf:/mnt# $ANDROID_HOME/tools/bin/sdkmanager "platforms;android-27"
root@3eae2071ceaf:/mnt# npm run final:android
...
45 actionable tasks: 2 executed, 43 up-to-date
Built the following apk(s):
	/mnt/platforms/android/app/build/outputs/apk/release/app-release-unsigned.apk

> copay@8.0.4 sign:android /mnt
> rm -f platforms/android/app/build/outputs/apk/release/android-release-signed-aligned.apk; jarsigner -verbose -sigalg SHA1withRSA -digestalg SHA1 -keystore ../copay.keystore -signedjar platforms/android/app/build/outputs/apk/release/android-release-signed.apk platforms/android/app/build/outputs/apk/release/app-release-unsigned.apk  copay_play && $ANDROID_HOME/build-tools/28.0.3/zipalign -v 4 platforms/android/app/build/outputs/apk/release/android-release-signed.apk platforms/android/app/build/outputs/apk/release/android-release-signed-aligned.apk

Enter Passphrase for keystore:
jarsigner: you must enter key password
npm ERR! code ELIFECYCLE
npm ERR! errno 1

Although it looks bad, here we actually have what we wanted: platforms/android/app/build/outputs/apk/release/app-release-unsigned.apk

We are not surprised to find this apk to massively differ from the one on Google Play as we were not building the (not published) correct version.

At this point we found there is a relevant commit:

$ git branch -r | grep "7.1"
  origin/v7.1
$ git checkout v7.1
Switched to branch 'v7.1'
Your branch is up to date with 'origin/v7.1'.
$ git log --grep="7.1.7"
commit 84acad445ad76e2572869d9c7bcd1eaf10764aa1 (HEAD -> v7.1, origin/v7.1)
Merge: be5809a48 685dbbb6d
Author: Matias Alejo Garcia <ematiu@gmail.com>
Date:   Thu Nov 14 16:45:11 2019 -0300

    Merge pull request #10333 from cmgustavo/bug/plugin-fcm-02

    Bump app v7.1.7 - Fix cordova-plugin-fcm

commit 685dbbb6d52f5f7db3b84c8e2fc5271b54d6e201
Author: Gustavo Maximiliano Cortez <cmgustavo83@gmail.com>
Date:   Thu Nov 14 11:33:20 2019 -0300

    Bump app v7.1.7 - Fix cordova-plugin-fcm

but compiling revision 84acad445ad76e did also result in massive differences with the version on Google Play:

BitPay diffs 1

BitPay diffs 2

this is by far not the only thing that differs

so our verdict remains: This app is not verifiable.

Above is not the whole picture of what we went through to get to this point. Here is just the command history from the Docker session:

root@3eae2071ceaf:/mnt# history
    1  cd /mnt/
    2  ll
    3  npm install
    4  apt update
    5  apt install python
    6  npm install
    7  apt install make
    8  npm install
    9  apt install g++
   10  npm install
   11  npm run clean-all
   12  npm install
   13  npm run apply:copay
   14  npm run prepare:copay
   15  git checkout v7.1.7
   16  git tag
   17  git log
   18  npm run prepare:copay
   19  npm run final:android
   20  $ANDROID_HOME/tools/bin/sdkmanager --licenses
   21  $ANDROID_HOME/tools/bin/sdkmanager update sdk --no-ui --filter android-27
   22  $ANDROID_HOME/tools/bin/sdkmanager update sdk --filter android-27
   23  $ANDROID_HOME/tools/bin/sdkmanager android-27
   24  $ANDROID_HOME/tools/bin/sdkmanager --list
   25  $ANDROID_HOME/tools/bin/sdkmanager update
   26  $ANDROID_HOME/tools/bin/sdkmanager platforms;android-27
   27  $ANDROID_HOME/tools/bin/sdkmanager "platforms;android-27"
   28  npm run final:android
   29  ll platforms/android/app/build/outputs/apk/release/app-release-unsigned.apk
   30  yes $ANDROID_HOME/tools/bin/sdkmanager "platforms;android-27"
   31  yes $ANDROID_HOME/tools/bin/sdkmanager "platforms;android-28"
   32  $ANDROID_HOME/tools/bin/sdkmanager "platforms;android-28"
   33  $ANDROID_HOME/tools/bin/sdkmanager "platforms;android-29"
   34  npm run final:android
   35  git checkout 84acad445ad
   36  history
   37  npm install
   38  npm run clean-all
   39  npm run apply:copay
   40  npm install
   41  npm run apply:copay
   42  history
   43  npm run prepare:copay
   44  npm run start:android
   45  history
   46  npm run final:android

With all the investigations above, this would be my build instructions:

$ docker run -v /path/to/copay:/mnt -it beevelop/cordova bash /mnt/build.sh

with this build.sh:

cd /mnt/ && \
apt update && \
apt install python make g++ -y && \
npm run clean-all && \
npm install && \
npm run apply:copay && \
npm run prepare:copay && \
yes | $ANDROID_HOME/tools/bin/sdkmanager "platforms;android-27" && \
yes "" | npm run final:android

Other Observations

Copay has a Bug Bounty Program.

Tests performed by Leo Wandersleb, Emanuel

Previous application build tests

2nd November 2022 12.6.4  
29th November 2019  

Do your own research

In addition to reading our analysis, it is important to do your own checks. Before transferring any bitcoin to your wallet, look up reviews for the wallet you want to use. They should be easy to find. If they aren't, that itself is a reason to be extra careful.