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Latest release: 2.6.2 ( 2nd October 2022 ) 🔍 Last analysed 1st October 2021 . Custodial: The provider holds the keys
4.6 ★★★★★
8 ratings
17th August 2019

As the provider of this product holds the keys, verifiability of the product is not relevant to the security of the funds!

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

Is the product self-custodial?

If the answer is "no", we mark it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys".

A custodial service is a service where the funds are held by a third party like the provider. The custodial service can at any point steal all the funds of all the users at their discretion. Our investigations stop there.

Some services might claim their setup is super secure, that they don’t actually have access to the funds, or that the access is shared between multiple parties. For our evaluation of it being a wallet, these details are irrelevant. They might be a trustworthy Bitcoin bank and they might be a better fit for certain users than being your own bank but our investigation still stops there as we are only interested in wallets.

Products that claim to be non-custodial but feature custodial accounts without very clearly marking those as custodial are also considered “custodial” as a whole to avoid misguiding users that follow our assessment.

This verdict means that the provider might or might not publish source code and maybe it is even possible to reproduce the build from the source code but as it is custodial, the provider already has control over the funds, so it is not a wallet where you would be in exclusive control of your funds.

We have to acknowledge that a huge majority of Bitcoiners are currently using custodial Bitcoin banks. If you do, please:

  • Do your own research if the provider is trust-worthy!
  • Check if you know at least enough about them so you can sue them when you have to!
  • Check if the provider is under a jurisdiction that will allow them to release your funds when you need them?
  • Check if the provider is taking security measures proportional to the amount of funds secured? If they have a million users and don’t use cold storage, that hot wallet is a million times more valuable for hackers to attack. A million times more effort will be taken by hackers to infiltrate their security systems.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.

Help spread awareness for build reproducibility

Please help us spread the word discussing the risks of centralized custodians with Bytesmix  via their Twitter!

Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis 

(Analysis from Android review)

Additional Observations

This app’s social media support is rather odd. The Twitter account appears to constantly retweet posts from a seemingly unrelated homescreen decoration service called Tile Widget. The Play Store reviews are very strange, with scam or review bombing accusations thrown around.

Dede Kurt
★☆☆☆☆ July 26, 2020
bad app and not good in support team

This was the reply from the Bytesmix team:

July 26, 2020
Same User write this :) You are so so so bad abusers in our service.

The App

For the actual app, there’s no clear information in the description about what it’s meant to be used for.

We have reduced the inconvenient phase in Deposit/Withdrawing. Save your withdrawal address, choose it immediately, and just send it.

It appears to be possible to send and receive BTC. Notably, nothing is mentioned about security or self-custody.

We installed the app. Upon trying to create a BTC wallet, we chose the option to “generate an address.” However this only resulted in an error message claiming:

not suppoort coin [sic]

Some features of the app are restricted and require KYC certification first. This includes identity verification.

From the Privacy Policy:

② Certification and normal use of the service

  1. The following information shall be collected for the customer certification for the payment, deposit and withdrawal and security enforcement etc Name, Date of birth, Gender, Photo of the person holing the identification card (Name, Date of birth and other information masking), customer verification using the cell phone (Name, date of birth, cell phone number), Identification card(Resident registration card, driver’s license, Passport) (Name, Date of birth and remaining information masking)

Due to the lack of self-custody and the use of KYC, it is safe to assume that this app is custodial and thus not verifiable.