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Trezor One

Latest release: 1.11.2 ( 17th August 2022 ) 🔍 Last analysed 5th December 2022 . Reproducible when tested
29th July 2014

The binary provided was reproducible from the code provided.

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

Does the binary we built differ from what we downloaded?

If the answer is "no", we mark it as "Reproducible when tested".

If we can reproduce the binary we downloaded from the public source code, with all bytes accounted for, we call the product reproducible. This does not mean we audited the code but it’s the precondition to make sure the public code has relevance for the provided binary.

If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, security researchers can see this if they care to look. It also means that inside the company, engineers can verify that the release manager is releasing the product based on code known to all engineers on the team. A scammer would have to work under the potential eyes of security researchers. He would have to take more effort in hiding any exploit.

“Reproducible” does not mean “verified”. There is good reason to believe that security researchers as of today would not detect very blatant backdoors in the public source code before it gets exploited, much less if the attacker takes moderate efforts to hide it. This is especially true for less popular projects.

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Disclaimer

The following Analysis is not a full code review! We plan to make code reviews available in the future but even then it will never be a stamp of approval but rather a list of incidents and questionable coding practice. Nasa sends probes to space that crash due to software bugs despite a huge budget and stringent scrutiny.

Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis 

With our test script this is the result:

$ ./scripts/test/hardware/trezorOne.sh 1.11.2
...
Fingerprints:
8f81bea82fdf0d83450cb7299c37b046846b42bd6875becc57de44e8e05e95a4 build/legacy/firmware/firmware.bin
dfae2000d1a8a7c5600dae9b1f53910311e35ce01c771702c4eafb5221ed3fde build/legacy-bitcoinonly/firmware/firmware.bin

Hash of non-signature parts downloaded/compiled standard:
9996665928ff72e5575412cc6cf2ba825cb3db459cb38caf4922f78b64ce34f9  -
9996665928ff72e5575412cc6cf2ba825cb3db459cb38caf4922f78b64ce34f9  -

Hash of non-signature parts downloaded/compiled bitcoinonly:
8fb3da9003abbe5d1409f24978f6b4abb0de358f61f2c259d0486a1e77c1169c  -
8fb3da9003abbe5d1409f24978f6b4abb0de358f61f2c259d0486a1e77c1169c  -

Hash of the signed firmware:
948098e56cf02f1d7b0660d44f02451dfd81b3114af87c962e7c6012f58853bb  trezor-1.11.2.bin
9f1544dd77483e9d39d1430325ae27574bf3604a463d5a59a03396cfc6cc5ca7  trezor-1.11.2-bitcoinonly.bin

That is a match. This firmware is reproducible for both the standard and the bitcoinonly version.

(lw)