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Trezor One

latest release: 1.10.3 ( 27th August 2021 ) last analysed  5th October 2021 Reproducible when tested 
29th July 2014

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Disclaimer

The following Analysis is not a full code review! We plan to make code reviews available in the future but even then it will never be a stamp of approval but rather a list of incidents and questionable coding practice. Nasa sends probes to space that crash due to software bugs despite a huge budget and stringent scrutiny.

Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis 

For the latest firmware version v1.10.3, we try the same as last time, wrapped into this script:

$ ./scripts/test/hardware/trezorOne.sh 1.10.3
...
Fingerprints:
54ccf155510b5292bd17ed748409d0d135112e24e62eb74184639460beecb213 build/core/firmware/firmware.bin
60fee3c9775d8ccf71099f6f7d277463efd128414cfb9be45656b1a26eeb7301 build/core-bitcoinonly/firmware/firmware.bin
14438fe4727ddc3153fa3c1aff2ced8867322aa54a0eb0277800e54cda488f50 build/legacy/firmware/firmware.bin
02f112cc2dda68ed19c7dbd71780e8dc7e749c2cadd645be6398c4762a8adf0f build/legacy-bitcoinonly/firmware/firmware.bin

Hash of non-signature parts downloaded/compiled:
513ba46603dc4bceb4a0c185bd7e8f1660c5615fd48ff8465361c817f7c215d9  -
513ba46603dc4bceb4a0c185bd7e8f1660c5615fd48ff8465361c817f7c215d9  -

Hash of the signed firmware:
50715ae29939575b5577725ae4062ab12514f85ac1bb761e881cc6876ff32055  trezor-1.10.3.bin


$ wget https://data.trezor.io/firmware/1/trezor-1.10.2.bin
$ git clone https://github.com/trezor/trezor-firmware.git
$ cd trezor-firmware/
$ git checkout legacy/v1.10.2
$ bash build-docker.sh legacy/v1.10.2
...
Fingerprints:
84bc47bb197b3ae7bfb096f03d4a528ccf6c9ef4dfee0aac4022971e4ec91d68 build/core/firmware/firmware.bin
fce4503fcadb68dc72144a562ec0a59e7c8d083e403e01bfc4c584161d79f596 build/core-bitcoinonly/firmware/firmware.bin
0d12bc0f3aaa80bfd8a6d801f6ca2ed4a08746faa293d5573edef233264dab03 build/legacy/firmware/firmware.bin
a7a022dea391d3d39ba04ce92b0a3eaf9ea2bdfcfdce955038505c821ea97cc3 build/legacy-bitcoinonly/firmware/firmware.bin
$ tail -c +1281 ../trezor-1.10.2.bin | sha256sum; \
> tail -c +1025 build/legacy/firmware/firmware.bin | sha256sum 
a0d77700aa0e815d1d1d17423139ebddf04a03a689689cba4270e2f163daafac  -
a0d77700aa0e815d1d1d17423139ebddf04a03a689689cba4270e2f163daafac  -

That is a match. This firmware is reproducible.

(lw)

Verdict Explained

The binary provided was reproducible from the code provided.

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

Does the binary we built differ from what we downloaded? If not, we tag it Reproducible 

If we can reproduce the binary we downloaded from the public source code, with all bytes accounted for, we call the product reproducible. This does not mean we audited the code but it’s the precondition to make sure the public code has relevance for the provided binary.

If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, security researchers can see this if they care to look. It also means that inside the company, engineers can verify that the release manager is releasing the product based on code known to all engineers on the team. A scammer would have to work under the potential eyes of security researchers. He would have to take more effort in hiding any exploit.

“Reproducible” does not mean “verified”. There is good reason to believe that security researchers as of today would not detect very blatant backdoors in the public source code before it gets exploited, much less if the attacker takes moderate efforts to hide it. This is especially true for less popular projects.