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ECOMI Secure Wallet

🔍 Last analysed 17th February 2022 . Leaks Keys
7th May 2018

Jump to verdict 

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Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

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The Analysis 

ECOMI’s Secure Wallet was announced on May 7, 2018 through bitcointalk.org.

Its hardware is powered by CoolBitX, the same manufacturer for the CoolWalletS bitcoin hardware wallet.

The card communicates via BlueTooth with a companion app. ECOMI Secure Wallet No Wallet

It has the following components:

  • E-paper Display
  • LED Indicator
  • Secure Element
  • Power / Confirmation button
  • Charging Terminals
  • Wireless Connector

A video introduction of the product is available on YouTube.

The recovery seed were initially in the form of numbers. A later update allowed users to convert to an alphabetical seed.

It should be noted that the seed phrases are generated and later on confirmed, on the companion app on the phone.

Like the CoolWalletS,

the private key has to be brought onto a different system that doesn’t necessarily share all the desired aspects of a hardware wallet.

(dg)

Verdict Explained

This product requires sharing private key material!

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

Does the device hide your keys from other devices? If not, we tag it Leaks Keys!

Some people claim their paper wallet is a hardware wallet. Others use RFID chips with the private keys on them. A very crucial drawback of those systems is that in order to send a transaction, the private key has to be brought onto a different system that doesn’t necessarily share all the desired aspects of a hardware wallet.

Paper wallets need to be printed, exposing the keys to the PC and the printer even before sending funds to it.

Simple RFID based devices can’t sign transactions - they share the keys with whoever asked to use them for whatever they please.

There are even products that are perfectly capable of working in an air-gapped fashion but they still expose the keys to connected devices.

This verdict is reserved for key leakage under normal operation and does not apply to devices where a hack is known to be possible with special hardware.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.