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Cypherock X1

Latest Release: 0.4.3075 12th May 2023

Our wallet review process

We examine wallets starting at the code level and continue all the way up to the finished app that lives on your device. Provided below is an outline of each of these steps along with security tips for you and general test results.

Developer

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Custody

Private keys generated and held by user

As part of our Methodology, we ask: Is the provider ignorant of the keys?

The answer is "yes". Private keys are generated by the user on the wallet.
Read more

Source code

Public on github

Released

7th April 2022

Application build

The binary provided was reproducible from the code provided.

See test result
Tested 25th May 2023

Platform notes

There is no globally accepted definition of a hardware wallet. Some consider a paper with 12 words a hardware wallet - after all paper is a sort of hardware or at least not software and the 12 words are arguably a wallet(‘s backup). For the purpose of this project we adhere to higher standards in the hardware wallet section. We only consider a hardware wallet if dedicated hardware protects the private keys in a way that leaves the user in full and exclusive control of what transactions he signs or not. That means:

  • The device allows to create private keys offline

  • The device never shares private key material apart from an offline backup mechanism

  • The device displays receive addresses for confirmation
  • The device shares signed transactions after informed approval on the device without reliance on insecure external hardware

Passed all 12 tests

We answered the following questions in this order:

Is this product the original?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Fake".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:

The bigger wallets often get imitated by scammers that abuse the reputation of the product by imitating its name, logo or both.

Imitating a competitor is a huge red flag and we urge you to not put any money into this product!

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Can we expect the product to ever be released?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Announced but never delivered" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Announced but never delivered".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Announced but never delivered" and the following would apply:

Some products are promoted with great fund raising, marketing and ICOs, to disappear from one day to the other a week later or they are one-man side projects that get refined for months or even years to still never materialize in an actual product. Regardless, those are projects we consider “vaporware”.

Is this product available yet?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Un-Released" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Un-Released".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Un-Released" and the following would apply:

We focus on products that have the biggest impact if things go wrong and while pre-sales sometimes reach many thousands to buy into promises that never materialize, the damage is limited and there would be little definite to be said about an unreleased product anyway.

If you find a product in this category that was released meanwhile, please contact us to do a proper review!

Is it a wallet?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Not a wallet".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:

If it’s called “wallet” but is actually only a portfolio tracker, we don’t look any deeper, assuming it is not meant to control funds. What has no funds, can’t lose your coins. It might still leak your financial history!

If you can buy Bitcoins with this app but only into another wallet, it’s not a wallet itself.

Is it for bitcoins?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:

At this point we only look into wallets that at least also support BTC.

Is the provider ignorant of the keys?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Provided private keys" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Provided private keys".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Provided private keys" and the following would apply:

The best hardware wallet cannot guarantee that the provider deleted the keys if the private keys were put onto the device by them in the first place.

There is no way of knowing if the provider took a copy in the process. If they did, all funds controlled by those devices are potentially also under the control of the provider and could be moved out of the client’s control at any time at the provider’s discretion.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Does the device hide your keys from other devices?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Leaks Keys" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Leaks Keys".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Leaks Keys" and the following would apply:

Some people claim their paper wallet is a hardware wallet. Others use RFID chips with the private keys on them. A very crucial drawback of those systems is that in order to send a transaction, the private key has to be brought onto a different system that doesn’t necessarily share all the desired aspects of a hardware wallet.

Paper wallets need to be printed, exposing the keys to the PC and the printer even before sending funds to it.

Simple RFID based devices can’t sign transactions - they share the keys with whoever asked to use them for whatever they please.

There are even products that are perfectly capable of working in an air-gapped fashion but they still expose the keys to connected devices.

This verdict is reserved for key leakage under normal operation and does not apply to devices where a hack is known to be possible with special hardware.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Can the user verify and approve transactions on the device?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Bad Interface" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Bad Interface".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Bad Interface" and the following would apply:

These are devices that might generate secure private key material, outside the reach of the provider but that do not have the means to let the user verify transactions on the device itself. This verdict includes screen-less smart cards or USB-dongles.

The wallet lacks either a screen or buttons or both. In consequence, crucial elements of approving transactions is being delegated to other hardware such as a general purpose PC or phone which defeats the purpose of a hardware wallet. For big exit scams, a companion app could always request two signatures - one for the coffee you are paying and a second to empty your wallet completely. The former could be broadcast while the latter only gets collected for later use.

Another consquence of a missing screen is that the user is faced with the dilemma of either not making a backup or having to pass the backup through an insecure device for display or storage.

The software of the device might be perfect but this device cannot be recommended due to this fundamental flaw.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is the source code publicly available?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "No source for current release found".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:

A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.

Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.

An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.

For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.

If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.

“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.

We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet. You should still prefer actual open source licenses as a competing wallet won’t use the code without giving it careful scrutiny.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Is the decompiled binary legible?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Obfuscated" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Obfuscated".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Obfuscated" and the following would apply:

When compiling source code to binary, usually a lot of meta information is retained. A variable storing a masterseed would usually still be called masterseed, so an auditor could inspect what happens to the masterseed. Does it get sent to some server? But obfuscation would rename it for example to _t12, making it harder to find what the product is doing with the masterseed.

In benign cases, code symbols are replaced by short strings to make the binary smaller but for the sake of transparency this should not be done for non-reproducible Bitcoin wallets. (Reproducible wallets could obfuscate the binary for size improvements as the reproducibility would assure the link between code and binary.)

Especially in the public source cases, obfuscation is a red flag. If the code is public, why obfuscate it?

As obfuscation is such a red flag when looking for transparency, we do also sometimes inspect the binaries of closed source apps.

As looking for code obfuscation is a more involved task, we do not inspect many apps but if we see other red flags, we might test this to then put the product into this red-flag category.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Can the product be built from the source provided?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Failed to build from source provided!" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Failed to build from source provided!".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Failed to build from source provided!" and the following would apply:

Published code doesn’t help much if the app fails to compile.

We try to compile the published source code using the published build instructions into a binary. If that fails, we might try to work around issues but if we consistently fail to build the app, we give it this verdict and open an issue in the issue tracker of the provider to hopefully verify their app later.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Does the published binary match the published source code?

The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Not reproducible from source provided" and the following would apply:

The answer is "no". We marked it as "Not reproducible from source provided".

We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Not reproducible from source provided" and the following would apply:

Published code doesn’t help much if it is not what the published binary was built from. That is why we try to reproduce the binary. We

  1. obtain the binary from the provider
  2. compile the published source code using the published build instructions into a binary
  3. compare the two binaries
  4. we might spend some time working around issues that are easy to work around

If this fails, we might search if other revisions match or if we can deduct the source of the mismatch but generally consider it on the provider to provide the correct source code and build instructions to reproduce the build, so we usually open a ticket in their code repository.

In any case, the result is a discrepancy between the binary we can create and the binary we can find for download and any discrepancy might leak your backup to the server on purpose or by accident.

As we cannot verify that the source provided is the source the binary was compiled from, this category is only slightly better than closed source but for now we have hope projects come around and fix verifiability issues.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.

Application build test result

Disclaimer: Vipul is the main author of this Analysis and also a contributor at Cypherock.

Cypherock was announced in a Bitcointalk ANN thread on February 14, 2020.

Cypherock X1 uses Shamir Secret Sharing to split the private key into 5 shards. Each of the 5 shards are independently stored on the hardware components, namely the X1 Wallet and 4 NFC enabled X1 cards. By implementing a 2/5 cryptographic threshold, a user only requires the X1 Wallet and 1 X1 card to re-create the private key and conduct transactions. Additionally, users don’t need to maintain any form of seed phrase backup as the hardware components themselves act as recovery tools. Cypherock’s private key management architecture not only eliminates the single point of failure of storing private keys in a singular location, but also solves for risks associated with seed phrase backups.

Key features

  • The code for the X1 Wallet is open source
  • Users can create a new wallet on the device or import their existing BIP39 compatible wallet to Cypherock X1 without connecting to the internet
  • The X1 Wallet is the interfacing device on which the seed regeneration and transaction operations are performed. X1 Wallet also stores 1 of the 5 Shamir shares.
  • Each of the 4 remaining Shamir shares is stored in a EAL5+ tamper resistant secure element chips. These are the same smart cards that are used in commercial debit and credit cards.
  • Private keys can be recovered by tapping any 1 out of the 4 X1 cards on the X1 Wallet. Shamir secret share stored in the X1 cards and X1 Wallet can optionally be protected using a PIN. The recovered keys are stored in a volatile memory on the X1 Wallet which gets wiped out as soon as the operation is done.
  • As Cypherock X1 Wallet does not store the private key as a whole, it is impossible to steal crypto assets in rest state.
  • X1 Wallet supports upto 4 wallet recovery phrases, which can be used for transactions or even as a backup.
  • X1 Wallet user can view the portfolio of all the 4 wallets from a single screen on their PC on the companion Cypherock CySync desktop application.
  • X1 Wallet provides increased security against $5 wrench attack by distributing card into different geographical locations.
  • X1 Wallet provides a 5 way navigation switch to perform user actions such as screen navigation and text input.

From the FAQ: Can the company somehow steal the digital assets of the user?

  • It is not possible for the company to steal the digital assets of the users. Cypherock X1 Wallet can recreate the private keys without internet access. The device needs to be connected to the internet just for broadcasting the transaction on the blockchain.
  • The provider further claims to use entropy from the ATECC608A “secure element” (which is not open to public audit) as well as from the microprocessor which runs the open source code. Thus, it should be able to prevent poor entropy backdoors in the closed source of the ATECC608A.

Public repository containing source code

  • Cypherock X1 Wallet firmware is open sourced, hosted in GitHub repo: Cypherock/x1_wallet_firmware
  • Latest release source code: Release v0.4.1290
  • Cypherock X1 Wallet firmware is released in 2 flavors, “initial firmware” and “main firmware”.
    • Initial firmware is installed on the device during manufacturing. It provides minimum functionality such as X1 Wallet and X1 Card authentication which checks if the product is genuine or not. This firmware does not support any wallet related functionality. The initial firmware ceases to exist before any wallet activity is initiated.
    • Main firmware full fledged wallet related functionality and is installed on the device via the companion Cypherock CySync desktop application.

Reproducibility of the release binary from the source code

  • Cypherock X1 Wallet firmware binary is signed by two private keys. The signature and a signed header is appended on top of firmware binary to form the complete Cypherock X1 Wallet firmware image.
  • An important thing to note here is that the Cypherock X1 Wallet firmware release binary is compiled using Docker.
  • Fingerprint (SHA256 digest) of the latest Cypherock X1 Wallet firmware binary (unsigned) can be found on the release page: Release v0.4.1290
  • The docker file corresponding to the latest release can be found here: Dockerfile v0.4.1290
  • List of tools required to successfully build the project can be found here: Building project
  • Sequence of commands run on docker can be found here: Docker commands v0.4.1290

Reproducing the Cypherock X1 Wallet Initial firmware v0.4.1290 on Windows 11

  • On Git Bash Shell, checkout X1 Wallet firmware using tag:
MINGW64 ~/Desktop/Cypherock/X1_wallet/Firmware/v0.4.1290 ((v0.4.1290)) $ git clone git@github.com:Cypherock/x1_wallet_firmware.git .  --recurse-submodules
MINGW64 ~/Desktop/Cypherock/X1_wallet/Firmware/v0.4.1290 ((v0.4.1290)) $ git checkout v0.4.1290
  • On Powershell, setup Docker and compile:
PS C:\Users\LENEVO\Desktop\Cypherock\X1_wallet\Firmware\v0.4.1290>  docker build . --file Dockerfile --tag x1-wallet-app-env
PS C:\Users\LENEVO\Desktop\Cypherock\X1_wallet\Firmware\v0.4.1290>  mkdir -p build
PS C:\Users\LENEVO\Desktop\Cypherock\X1_wallet\Firmware\v0.4.1290>  docker run -v ${pwd}/build:/out -it x1-wallet-app-env /bin/ash
/home/build/Release # mkdir -p /dist/initial && cd /home
/home/build/Release # cd build/Release/
/home/build/Release # cmake -DDEV_SWITCH=OFF -DDEBUG_SWITCH=OFF -DSIGN_BINARY=OFF -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:STRING=Release -DFIRMWARE_TYPE=Initial -DCMAKE_EXPORT_COMPILE_COMMANDS:BOOL=ON -DCMAKE_BUILD_PLATFORM:STRING=Device -G Ninja ../../
/home/build/Release # ninja
/home/build/Release # sha256sum Cypherock-Initial.bin
dc665362d2bc1c15c5105e129694a2a31c8de1ba0245534244bb15500b8af2ee  Cypherock-Initial.bin
cp Cypherock-*.* /dist/initial && cp -a /dist/. /out
exit

MINGW64 ~/Desktop/Cypherock/X1_wallet/Firmware/v0.4.1290 ((v0.4.1290)) $ sha256sum.exe initial-release-outputs/release/Cypherock-Initial.bin
dc665362d2bc1c15c5105e129694a2a31c8de1ba0245534244bb15500b8af2ee *initial-release-outputs/release/Cypherock-Initial.bin

Fingerprint (SHA256 hash) of released unsigned initial X1 Wallet firmware binary and compiled initial X1 Wallet firmware binary matches. Therefore, we conclude that the firmware is reproducible.

Reproducing the Cypherock X1 Wallet Main firmware v0.4.1290 on Windows 11

  • On Git Bash Shell, checkout X1 Wallet firmware using tag:
MINGW64 ~/Desktop/Cypherock/X1_wallet/Firmware/v0.4.1290 ((v0.4.1290)) $ git clone git@github.com:Cypherock/x1_wallet_firmware.git . --recurse-submodules
MINGW64 ~/Desktop/Cypherock/X1_wallet/Firmware/v0.4.1290 ((v0.4.1290)) $ git checkout v0.4.1290
  • On Powershell, setup Docker and compile:
PS C:\Users\LENEVO\Desktop\Cypherock\X1_wallet\Firmware\v0.4.1290>  docker build . --file Dockerfile --tag x1-wallet-app-env
PS C:\Users\LENEVO\Desktop\Cypherock\X1_wallet\Firmware\v0.4.1290>  mkdir -p build
PS C:\Users\LENEVO\Desktop\Cypherock\X1_wallet\Firmware\v0.4.1290>  docker run -v ${pwd}/build:/out -it x1-wallet-app-env /bin/ash
/home/build/Release # mkdir -p /dist/main && cd /home
/home/build/Release # cd build/Release/
/home/build/Release # cmake -DDEV_SWITCH=OFF -DDEBUG_SWITCH=OFF -DSIGN_BINARY=OFF -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:STRING=Release -DFIRMWARE_TYPE=Main -DCMAKE_EXPORT_COMPILE_COMMANDS:BOOL=ON -DCMAKE_BUILD_PLATFORM:STRING=Device -G Ninja ../../
/home/build/Release # ninja
/home/build/Release # sha256sum Cypherock-Main.bin
fe5dd33a719eff4e2aa869108ba139e6f87204e6263870b0c5da1113b72ac32c  Cypherock-Main.bin
cp Cypherock-*.* /dist/main && cp -a /dist/. /out
exit

MINGW64 ~/Desktop/Cypherock/X1_wallet/Firmware/v0.4.1290 ((v0.4.1290))
$ sha256sum.exe main-release-outputs/release/Cypherock-Main.bin
fe5dd33a719eff4e2aa869108ba139e6f87204e6263870b0c5da1113b72ac32c *main-release-outputs/release/Cypherock-Main.bin

Fingerprint (SHA256 hash) of released unsigned main X1 Wallet firmware binary and compiled main X1 Wallet firmware binary matches. Therefore, we conclude that the firmware is reproducible.

Installing firmware updates

  • The user has the flexibility to install a firmware update or not. The secure bootloader, which forms the root of trust, verifies if the firmware is a newer version than the currently installed version and verifies the source of the firmware (through 2 signatures).
  • Users can view the installed version and the commit hash of the release corresponding to the installed Cypherock X1 Wallet firmware binary and can verify it against the GitHub repository. This cross check should provide enough confidence to the user that the installed firmware binary matches the release binary on the public source.
  • However, based on feedback received from different users, Cypherock X1 Wallet team is planning to add a user configurable functionality, through which SHA256 digest of the newly installed firmware is displayed after a successful firmware update.

Reproduced above procedure by Leo

Leo independently reproduced version v0.4.2307 as follows:

$ git clone git@github.com:Cypherock/x1_wallet_firmware.git
$ cd x1_wallet_firmware/
$ git checkout v0.4.2307 
$ git submodule update --init --recursive
$ podman run --volume=${PWD}/build:/out --rm -it x1-wallet-app-env /bin/ash -c "\
    mkdir -p /dist/initial && cd /home/build/Release/ ;\
    cmake -DDEV_SWITCH=OFF -DDEBUG_SWITCH=OFF -DSIGN_BINARY=OFF -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:STRING=Release -DFIRMWARE_TYPE=Initial -DCMAKE_EXPORT_COMPILE_COMMANDS:BOOL=ON -DCMAKE_BUILD_PLATFORM:STRING=Device -G Ninja ../../ ; \
    ninja; \
    cp Cypherock-*.* /dist/initial && cp -a /dist/. /out"
$ podman run --volume=${PWD}/build:/out --rm -it x1-wallet-app-env /bin/ash -c "\
    mkdir -p /dist/initial && cd /home/build/Release/ ;\
    cmake -DDEV_SWITCH=OFF -DDEBUG_SWITCH=OFF -DSIGN_BINARY=OFF -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:STRING=Release -DFIRMWARE_TYPE=Main -DCMAKE_EXPORT_COMPILE_COMMANDS:BOOL=ON -DCMAKE_BUILD_PLATFORM:STRING=Device -G Ninja ../../ ; \
    ninja; \
    cp Cypherock-*.* /dist/initial && cp -a /dist/. /out"
$ wget https://github.com/Cypherock/x1_wallet_firmware/releases/download/v0.4.2307/Cypherock-{Initial,Main}.bin
$ sha256sum build/initial/Cypherock-Initial.bin Cypherock-Initial.bin build/initial/Cypherock-Main.bin Cypherock-Main.bin
757d8c49b8f084400e7c8631b7e8f5cbfe4b7d527cfd8a7e056c1f43f9232e63  build/initial/Cypherock-Initial.bin
757d8c49b8f084400e7c8631b7e8f5cbfe4b7d527cfd8a7e056c1f43f9232e63  Cypherock-Initial.bin
09ed533290cdff4ca5f8148597a4d0a924ab5f10010a30ec2866abd39558a62d  build/initial/Cypherock-Main.bin
09ed533290cdff4ca5f8148597a4d0a924ab5f10010a30ec2866abd39558a62d  Cypherock-Main.bin

Reproduced by Mohammad

Mohammad independently reproduced version v0.4.3075 with this results:

$ sha256sum build/Cypherock-Initial.bin Cypherock-Initial.bin build/Cypherock-Main.bin Cypherock-Main.bin
649f94d564c822291080ea27f81815c67ff08e60a3f6f00cd2936851ab9e98dd  build/Cypherock-Initial.bin
649f94d564c822291080ea27f81815c67ff08e60a3f6f00cd2936851ab9e98dd  Cypherock-Initial.bin
656945ae37510bb1b7452c97d27cd5b638ddb0119e44e9af5aa32e02302f458e  build/Cypherock-Main.bin
656945ae37510bb1b7452c97d27cd5b638ddb0119e44e9af5aa32e02302f458e  Cypherock-Main.bin

Tests performed by Matthew Lamb, Daniel Andrei R. Garcia, Vipul, Leo Wandersleb, Mohammad

Previous application build tests

0.4.2307  

Disclaimer

Our Analysis is not a full code review! We plan to make code reviews available in the future but even then it will never be a stamp of approval but rather a list of incidents and questionable coding practice. Nasa sends probes to space that crash due to software bugs despite a huge budget and stringent scrutiny.

Do your own research

In addition to reading our analysis, it is important to do your own checks. Before transferring any bitcoin to your wallet, look up reviews for the wallet you want to use. They should be easy to find. If they aren't, that itself is a reason to be extra careful.