AirGap Vault - Tezos, Cosmos, Ethereum, Bitcoinlatest release: 3.6.2 last analysed 3rd March 2021
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The following Analysis is not a full code review! We plan to make code reviews available in the future but even then it will never be a stamp of approval but rather a list of incidents and questionable coding practice. Nasa sends probes to space that crash due to software bugs despite a huge budget and stringent scrutiny.
Do your own research!
Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.
Update 2021-03-03: Below analysis was replaced with the app as distributed by Google Play. Interestingly the hash differed but it differed due to the zip container having used a different compression or something. Either way, both binaries look good.
Update 2021-02-27: The following analysis is from a future release that is not yet available through Google Play. We obtained it from this repo.
We ran our test script. which delivered these results:
Results: appId: it.airgap.vault signer: 486381324d8669c80ca9b8c79d383dc972ec284227d65ebfe9e31cad5fd3f342 apkVersionName: 3.6.2 apkVersionCode: 26847 apkHash: 2394251a22f5658ed60187854f1a8d1dd97af367c779c698f3e4a75516c5d025 Diff: Files /tmp/fromPlay_it.airgap.vault_26847/apktool.yml and /tmp/fromBuild_it.airgap.vault_26847/apktool.yml differ Files /tmp/fromPlay_it.airgap.vault_26847/original/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF and /tmp/fromBuild_it.airgap.vault_26847/original/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF differ Only in /tmp/fromPlay_it.airgap.vault_26847/original/META-INF: PAPERS.RSA Only in /tmp/fromPlay_it.airgap.vault_26847/original/META-INF: PAPERS.SF Revision, tag (and its signature): object d6a4c99d48039454663d5e8a93fcf62fbfd51fc9 type commit tag v3.6.2 tagger Andreas Gassmann <email@example.com> 1614355245 +0000 AirGap Vault v3.6.2
This is what we expect to see on a reproducible app.
At the time of this analysis, the app as downloaded from the platform was reproducible from the code provided by the developers!
The app can be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, security researchers can see this if they care to look. It also means that inside the company engineers can verify that the release manager is releasing the app based on code known to all engineers on the team. A scammer would have to work under the potential eyes of security researchers. He would have to take more effort in hiding any exploit.
"Reproducible" does not mean "verified". There is good reason to believe that security researchers as of today would not detect very blatant backdoors in the public source code before it gets exploited, much less if the attacker takes moderate efforts to hide it.
To understand why some lines of difference are ok and others not one has to consider how app signing works. Android supports currently 3 signing schemes and in version 1 signing the signature is put inside the application file. As the tester must not have the release signing key, those files necessarily are missing or differ from the version on Google Play. The file "apktool.yml" was never part of the app and is generated by the analysis tool "apktool".
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