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AirGap Vault - Tezos, Cosmos, Ethereum, Bitcoin

latest release: 3.11.0 ( 8th October 2021 ) last analysed  21st September 2021 Reproducible when tested 
4.0 ★★★★★
90 ratings
10 thousand
6th August 2018

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Disclaimer

The following Analysis is not a full code review! We plan to make code reviews available in the future but even then it will never be a stamp of approval but rather a list of incidents and questionable coding practice. Nasa sends probes to space that crash due to software bugs despite a huge budget and stringent scrutiny.

Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis 

We ran our test script which delivered these results:

Results:
appId:          it.airgap.vault
signer:         486381324d8669c80ca9b8c79d383dc972ec284227d65ebfe9e31cad5fd3f342
apkVersionName: 3.10.0
apkVersionCode: 34171
verdict:        reproducible
appHash:        19391ace82f01aa19fb31b3e72949fa8d77b1857c4781e73f2cf2cd828b1df60
commit:         6f9b2767e1d9365fed0beba0d3d0850a51491b6a

Diff:
Files /tmp/fromPlay_it.airgap.vault_34171/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF and /tmp/fromBuild_it.airgap.vault_34171/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF differ
Only in /tmp/fromPlay_it.airgap.vault_34171/META-INF: PAPERS.RSA
Only in /tmp/fromPlay_it.airgap.vault_34171/META-INF: PAPERS.SF

Revision, tag (and its signature):
object 6f9b2767e1d9365fed0beba0d3d0850a51491b6a
type commit
tag v3.10.0
tagger Mike Godenzi <m.godenzi@papers.ch> 1631939902 +0200

version 3.10.0

which is what we want to see to consider it reproducible.

(lw)

Verdict Explained

The binary provided was reproducible from the code provided.

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

Does the binary we built differ from what we downloaded? If not, we tag it Reproducible 

If we can reproduce the binary we downloaded from the public source code, with all bytes accounted for, we call the product reproducible. This does not mean we audited the code but it’s the precondition to make sure the public code has relevance for the provided binary.

If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, security researchers can see this if they care to look. It also means that inside the company, engineers can verify that the release manager is releasing the product based on code known to all engineers on the team. A scammer would have to work under the potential eyes of security researchers. He would have to take more effort in hiding any exploit.

“Reproducible” does not mean “verified”. There is good reason to believe that security researchers as of today would not detect very blatant backdoors in the public source code before it gets exploited, much less if the attacker takes moderate efforts to hide it. This is especially true for less popular projects.