This Android app was first launched on 6th August 2018 and currently has more than 5000 downloads, a 3.9 stars rating from 38 users and the latest release is version 3.3.0.
We found these ways of contacting the developers:
- Review of version 3.3.0 on 17th July 2020 (verdict: nonverifiable)
- Review of version 3.2.0 on 28th April 2020 (verdict: reproducible)
- Review of version 3.1.0 on 9th April 2020 (verdict: reproducible)
- Review of version 3.0.0 on 6th January 2020 (verdict: reproducible)
- Review of version 3.0.0 on 29th December 2019 (verdict: nonverifiable)
Help spread awareness for build reproducibility
Please follow AirGap Vault - Tezos, Cosmos, Ethereum, Bitcoin and thank them for being reproducible via their Twitter!
The following Analysis is not a full code review! We plan to make code reviews available in the future but even then it will never be a stamp of approval but rather a list of incidents and questionable coding practice. Nasa sends probes to space that crash due to software bugs despite a huge budget and stringent scrutiny.
Do your own research!
Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.
For the latest version our test script. came to this conclusion:
Results: appId: it.airgap.vault signer: 486381324d8669c80ca9b8c79d383dc972ec284227d65ebfe9e31cad5fd3f342 apkVersionName: 3.3.0 apkVersionCode: 20379 apkHash: caa4da6ca8fa905e4b25594bebbbcb4bfe030a70178ca65a9b0a60f2651bb316 Diff: Files /tmp/fromPlay_it.airgap.vault_20379/apktool.yml and /tmp/fromBuild_it.airgap.vault_20379/apktool.yml differ Files /tmp/fromPlay_it.airgap.vault_20379/original/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF and /tmp/fromBuild_it.airgap.vault_20379/original/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF differ Only in /tmp/fromPlay_it.airgap.vault_20379/original/META-INF: PAPERS.RSA Only in /tmp/fromPlay_it.airgap.vault_20379/original/META-INF: PAPERS.SF Revision, tag (and its signature): object 453b522dbbe53a603ccbfd01d07bf24f85ad838b type commit tag v3.3.0 tagger Andreas Gassmann <firstname.lastname@example.org> 1595232900 +0200 Version Code: 20379
which is what we expect to see for the verdict: reproducible.
Reproducible: The provided Source Code matches the app released on Google Play
The app can be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, security researchers can see this if they care to look. It also means that inside the company engineers can verify that the release manager is releasing the app based on code known to all engineers on the team. A scammer would have to work under the potential eyes of security researchers. He would have to take more effort in hiding any exploit.
"Reproducible" does not mean "verified". There is good reason to believe that security researchers as of today would not detect very blatant backdoors in the public source code before it gets exploited, much less if the attacker takes moderate efforts to hide it.
To understand why some lines of difference are ok and others not one has to consider how app signing works. Android supports currently 3 signing schemes and in version 1 signing the signature is put inside the application file. As the tester must not have the release signing key, those files necessarily are missing or differ from the version on Google Play. The file "apktool.yml" was never part of the app and is generated by the analysis tool "apktool".
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