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Muun - Bitcoin and Lightning Wallet

Latest release: 49.3 ( 27th April 2022 ) πŸ” Last analysed 8th May 2022 . Not reproducible from source provided
4.5 β˜…β˜…β˜…β˜…β˜…
650 ratings
50 thousand
25th April 2017

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Help spread awareness for build reproducibility

Please help us spread the word, asking Muun - Bitcoin and Lightning Wallet to support reproducible builds  via their Twitter!

Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis 

With this test script (?) we get:

===== Begin Results =====
appId:          io.muun.apollo
signer:         026ae0ac859cc32adf2d4e7aa909daf902f40db0b4fe6138358026fd62836ad1
apkVersionName: 49.3
apkVersionCode: 903
appHash:        70fcd9491963e6fe27f9efd41d3c90abf63539d0f9528de8abbad964675de723
commit:         e65b56b7128094ef7c188d00828747ee01b3fad6

Files /tmp/fromPlay_io.muun.apollo_903/classes2.dex and /tmp/fromBuild_io.muun.apollo_903/classes2.dex differ
Files /tmp/fromPlay_io.muun.apollo_903/classes.dex and /tmp/fromBuild_io.muun.apollo_903/classes.dex differ
Only in /tmp/fromPlay_io.muun.apollo_903/META-INF: APOLLORE.RSA
Only in /tmp/fromPlay_io.muun.apollo_903/META-INF: APOLLORE.SF
Only in /tmp/fromPlay_io.muun.apollo_903/META-INF: MANIFEST.MF
Files /tmp/fromPlay_io.muun.apollo_903/resources.arsc and /tmp/fromBuild_io.muun.apollo_903/resources.arsc differ

Revision, tag (and its signature):
object e65b56b7128094ef7c188d00828747ee01b3fad6
type commit
tag v49.3
tagger acrespo <alvaro.andres.crespo@gmail.com> 1651007577 -0300

===== End Results =====

Sadly that is not verifiable.


Verdict Explained

We could not verify that the provided code matches the binary!

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

Is the published binary matching the published source code? If not, we tag it Unreproducible!

Published code doesn’t help much if it is not what the published binary was built from. That is why we try to reproduce the binary. We

  1. obtain the binary from the provider
  2. compile the published source code using the published build instructions into a binary
  3. compare the two binaries
  4. we might spend some time working around issues that are easy to work around

If this fails, we might search if other revisions match or if we can deduct the source of the mismatch but generally consider it on the provider to provide the correct source code and build instructions to reproduce the build, so we usually open a ticket in their code repository.

In any case, the result is a discrepancy between the binary we can create and the binary we can find for download and any discrepancy might leak your backup to the server on purpose or by accident.

As we cannot verify that the source provided is the source the binary was compiled from, this category is only slightly better than closed source but for now we have hope projects come around and fix verifiability issues.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.