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Bitcoin Wallet (Schildbach)
("Bitcoin Wallet" on the Play Store. For details read below.)

latest release: 8.11 last analysed  11th March 2021
Reproducible when tested
3.9 ★★★★★
27242 ratings
5million
1st March 2011

Published:

Our last analysis is based on data found in their Play Store description and their website and their source repository. We discuss issues with the provider here.
details below 

Older reviews (show 16 of 16 reproducible)

Disclaimer

The following Analysis is not a full code review! We plan to make code reviews available in the future but even then it will never be a stamp of approval but rather a list of incidents and questionable coding practice. Nasa sends probes to space that crash due to software bugs despite a huge budget and stringent scrutiny.

Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis

For the latest version the test script came to these results:

Results:
appId:          de.schildbach.wallet
signer:         58dcd8a0edf2a590683ba022d22a8dca5659aabf4728741a5c07af738d53db38
apkVersionName: 8.11
apkVersionCode: 811
apkHash:        6ca9862f4c53723ed77d3c2c85a46028c950f665dbac30c9c4aedde719988654

Diff:
Files /tmp/fromPlay_de.schildbach.wallet_811/apktool.yml and /tmp/fromBuild_de.schildbach.wallet_811/apktool.yml differ
Only in /tmp/fromPlay_de.schildbach.wallet_811/original/META-INF: BITCOIN-.RSA
Only in /tmp/fromPlay_de.schildbach.wallet_811/original/META-INF: BITCOIN-.SF
Files /tmp/fromPlay_de.schildbach.wallet_811/original/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF and /tmp/fromBuild_de.schildbach.wallet_811/original/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF differ

Revision, tag (and its signature):
object 665230c7955401b8c6e6f3983692b49582d8e628
type commit
tag v8.11
tagger Andreas Schildbach <andreas@schildbach.de> 1614507930 +0100

8.11 release

That is what we expected to again give this app the verdict reproducible.

(lw)

Verdict Explained

Reproducible when tested

At the time of this analysis, the app as downloaded from the platform was reproducible from the code provided by the developers!

The app can be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, security researchers can see this if they care to look. It also means that inside the company engineers can verify that the release manager is releasing the app based on code known to all engineers on the team. A scammer would have to work under the potential eyes of security researchers. He would have to take more effort in hiding any exploit.

"Reproducible" does not mean "verified". There is good reason to believe that security researchers as of today would not detect very blatant backdoors in the public source code before it gets exploited, much less if the attacker takes moderate efforts to hide it.

To understand why some lines of difference are ok and others not one has to consider how app signing works. Android supports currently 3 signing schemes and in version 1 signing the signature is put inside the application file. As the tester must not have the release signing key, those files necessarily are missing or differ from the version on Google Play. The file "apktool.yml" was never part of the app and is generated by the analysis tool "apktool".