Bitcoin Walletlatest release: Varies with device last analysed 29th December 2020
Older reviews (show 15 of 15 reproducible)
The following Analysis is not a full code review! We plan to make code reviews available in the future but even then it will never be a stamp of approval but rather a list of incidents and questionable coding practice. Nasa sends probes to space that crash due to software bugs despite a huge budget and stringent scrutiny.
Do your own research!
Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.
For the latest version the test script came to these results:
Results: appId: de.schildbach.wallet signer: 58dcd8a0edf2a590683ba022d22a8dca5659aabf4728741a5c07af738d53db38 apkVersionName: 8.08 apkVersionCode: 808 apkHash: c16a1e33ae3b6b1f66e0029a3385323d8e3d3ccf8e58394284c96c4268ba6625 Diff: Files /tmp/fromPlay_de.schildbach.wallet_808/apktool.yml and /tmp/fromBuild_de.schildbach.wallet_808/apktool.yml differ Only in /tmp/fromPlay_de.schildbach.wallet_808/original/META-INF: BITCOIN-.RSA Only in /tmp/fromPlay_de.schildbach.wallet_808/original/META-INF: BITCOIN-.SF Files /tmp/fromPlay_de.schildbach.wallet_808/original/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF and /tmp/fromBuild_de.schildbach.wallet_808/original/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF differ Revision, tag (and its signature): object 67c1b8ce0d7747fb6c36da823e0afef4dfd8352f type commit tag v8.08 tagger Andreas Schildbach <email@example.com> 1607080536 +0100 8.08 release
That is what we expected to again give this app the verdict reproducible.
At the time of this analysis, the app on Google Play was reproducible from the code provided by the developers!
The app can be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, security researchers can see this if they care to look. It also means that inside the company engineers can verify that the release manager is releasing the app based on code known to all engineers on the team. A scammer would have to work under the potential eyes of security researchers. He would have to take more effort in hiding any exploit.
"Reproducible" does not mean "verified". There is good reason to believe that security researchers as of today would not detect very blatant backdoors in the public source code before it gets exploited, much less if the attacker takes moderate efforts to hide it.
To understand why some lines of difference are ok and others not one has to consider how app signing works. Android supports currently 3 signing schemes and in version 1 signing the signature is put inside the application file. As the tester must not have the release signing key, those files necessarily are missing or differ from the version on Google Play. The file "apktool.yml" was never part of the app and is generated by the analysis tool "apktool".
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<iframe src="/widget/#appId=de.schildbach.wallet&theme=auto&style=short" name="_ts" style="min-width: 180px;border: 0;border-radius: 10px;max-width:280px;height: 130px;" > </iframe>
<iframe src="/widget/#appId=de.schildbach.wallet&theme=auto&style=long" style="max-width:100%;width:342px;border:0;border-radius:10px;min-height: 510px;" > </iframe>