Trust: Crypto & Bitcoin Walletlatest release: 2.7 ( 22nd October 2021 ) last analysed 20th November 2019 No source for current release found
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Do your own research!
Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.
The Analysis ¶
Trust - Crypto & Bitcoin Wallet claims to be a non-custodial wallet. In the description on Google Play we read:
Trust Wallet provides a full security audited system to send, receive and store multiple digital assets so that you have complete control over your private keys that are only stored on your device.
They decided to close their Android app’s source code and provided an explanation:
As of today, we decided to move the Trust Wallet app for Android into closed source development.
It has come to our attention that some dishonest developers have been cloning Trust Wallet and either scamming users or using the code without permission as their own product. Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to trace and remove those applications in the Android ecosystem.
We would like to support Coinomi wallet on this critical issue. We understand their decision for keeping wallet closed source to protect users and would like to do the same.
Our mission doesn’t change. We still want to be transparent in the development of our product, that is why we have made an earlier version of Trust Wallet for Android available to public.
We would like to support Coinomi wallet on this critical issue
made us to look into Coinomi more closely.
Also in the description we read:
Trust Browser is a full-fledged Web3 browser that allows you to interact with decentralized applications (DApp) directly from the app.
which raises strong security concerns given browsers are prone to security issues and the Android way of giving exclusive access of apps to their own data usually means that all code within the app is a huge step closer to the app’s data and thus the private keys than other apps for example and as browsers (and certainly “full-fledged … browsers”) come with code execution, malicious code could be dynamically loaded without being subject to code review.
Without public code the verdict is anyway: not verifiable.
Without public source of the reviewed release available, this product cannot be verified!
As part of our Methodology, we ask:Is the source code publicly available? If not, we tag it No Source!
A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.
Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.
An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.
For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.
If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.
“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.
We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet.
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