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Mycelium Bitcoin Wallet

latest release: last analysed  1st April 2021
Reproducible when tested
4.2 ★★★★★
10484 ratings
1st July 2013


Our last analysis is based on data found in their Play Store description and their website and their source repository.
details below 

Older reviews (show 14 of 17 reproducible)

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The following Analysis is not a full code review! We plan to make code reviews available in the future but even then it will never be a stamp of approval but rather a list of incidents and questionable coding practice. Nasa sends probes to space that crash due to software bugs despite a huge budget and stringent scrutiny.

Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis

Update 2021-04-01: Emanuel Bronshtein also was able to reproduce v3.8.9.0.

Disclaimer: The authors of this project have contributed to Mycelium. Andreas Schildbach was so kind and independently tested and confirmed Mycelium’s verifiability here for a past version. Independent tests would be highly welcome!

Here we test if the latest version also can be reproduced, following the known procedure expressed in our test script:

As the reproducibility issue was not resolved yet, the following results were obtained on a DigitalOcean server:

appId:          com.mycelium.wallet
signer:         b8e59d4a60b65290efb2716319e50b94e298d7a72c76c2119eb7d8d3afac302e
apkVersionCode: 3080900
apkHash:        296a97308aa10a98bc678e9b0ffd94c7daf120c24fa07cdaa7ad9179ace7416c

Files /tmp/fromPlay_com.mycelium.wallet_3080900/original/META-INF/CERT.RSA and /tmp/fromBuild_com.mycelium.wallet_3080900/original/META-INF/CERT.RSA differ

Revision, tag (and its signature):
object 5c5d672c4991fcfef650d1851cf5178dfa7340bc
type commit
tag v3.8.9.0
tagger Leo Wandersleb <leo.wandersleb@mycelium.com> 1616729523 -0300


which is what we want to see to give this wallet the verdict: reproducible


Verdict Explained

Reproducible when tested

At the time of this analysis, the app as downloaded from the platform was reproducible from the code provided by the developers!

The app can be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, security researchers can see this if they care to look. It also means that inside the company engineers can verify that the release manager is releasing the app based on code known to all engineers on the team. A scammer would have to work under the potential eyes of security researchers. He would have to take more effort in hiding any exploit.

"Reproducible" does not mean "verified". There is good reason to believe that security researchers as of today would not detect very blatant backdoors in the public source code before it gets exploited, much less if the attacker takes moderate efforts to hide it.

To understand why some lines of difference are ok and others not one has to consider how app signing works. Android supports currently 3 signing schemes and in version 1 signing the signature is put inside the application file. As the tester must not have the release signing key, those files necessarily are missing or differ from the version on Google Play. The file "apktool.yml" was never part of the app and is generated by the analysis tool "apktool".