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Upbit (Global), the Digital-Asset Exchange

latest release: 1.5.15p2 ( 19th October 2021 ) last analysed  10th October 2021 Custodial: The provider holds the keys 
4.6 ★★★★★
3338 ratings
100 thousand
6th November 2018

Jump to verdict 

Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis 

App Description

Upbit (Global) is not that much different from its Korean counterpart, 업비트 - 가장 신뢰받는 디지털 자산(비트코인, 이더리움, 비트코인캐시) 거래소 Custodial! 

Upbit describes itself as a Digital Asset exchange, and makes a few claims about its security:

  • BitGo Dual Wallet, the choice of global top exchanges.
  • Multi-sig cold wallet, 2FA and fund password for enhanced security.
  • 24/7 real-time security monitoring system.

The Site

Terms of Service

From Article 23, 1:

Without prejudice to Article 7(4), the Company may restrict Users from logging on or access to the User’s Account if it deems appropriate, including without limitation under any of the following circumstances:[…]

Article 31, 13:

Users must not create security over its Digital Assets or such other e-money or digital currency held in the User’s Upbit Account and Wallet unless the Company’s prior consent in writing has been obtained.

The App

We tried the app. You cannot deposit or withdraw BTC as well as other altcoins without finishing their level 2 KYC. Mnemonics are not provided.


This is a custodial app, and therefore not verifiable.


Verdict Explained

As the provider of this product holds the keys, verifiability of the product is not relevant to the security of the funds!

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

Is the product self-custodial? If not, we tag it Custodial! 

A custodial service is a service where the funds are held by a third party like the provider. The custodial service can at any point steal all the funds of all the users at their discretion. Our investigations stop there.

Some services might claim their setup is super secure, that they don’t actually have access to the funds, or that the access is shared between multiple parties. For our evaluation of it being a wallet, these details are irrelevant. They might be a trustworthy Bitcoin bank and they might be a better fit for certain users than being your own bank but our investigation still stops there as we are only interested in wallets.

Products that claim to be non-custodial but feature custodial accounts without very clearly marking those as custodial are also considered “custodial” as a whole to avoid misguiding users that follow our assessment.

This verdict means that the provider might or might not publish source code and maybe it is even possible to reproduce the build from the source code but as it is custodial, the provider already has control over the funds, so it is not a wallet where you would be in exclusive control of your funds.

We have to acknowledge that a huge majority of Bitcoiners are currently using custodial Bitcoin banks. If you do, please:

  • Do your own research if the provider is trust-worthy!
  • Check if you know at least enough about them so you can sue them when you have to!
  • Check if the provider is under a jurisdiction that will allow them to release your funds when you need them?
  • Check if the provider is taking security measures proportional to the amount of funds secured? If they have a million users and don’t use cold storage, that hot wallet is a million times more valuable for hackers to attack. A million times more effort will be taken by hackers to infiltrate their security systems.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.