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BitShield Wallet - Bitcoin Wallet

latest release: 1.28 last analysed  1st December 2020
No source code found
4.8 ★★★★★
1465 ratings
9th June 2020


Our last analysis is based on data found in their Play Store description and their website.
details below 

Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis

In this app’s description we read:

  • Non-Custodial. You own your wallet private keys.

A 5.0 stars rating from 957 ratings doesn’t look natural but let’s see if it’s open source.

On their website:

We are privacy activists who have dedicated our lives to creating the software that Silicon Valley will never build. We build the software that Bitcoin deserves.

which was taken almost word for word from another wallet’s website.

… which leads us to wonder if the provider is also secretive about who they are and sure enough, no mention of the people behind this product.

The domain name owner is not on public record neither:

Registrant Name: WhoisGuard Protected

Registrant Organization: WhoisGuard, Inc.

We have no problem with privacy minded providers as long as the product can be fully and easily verified. In this case we do not even find a claim of public source and the Xamarin based app contains native code, making it hard to get any insights. Anyway, by our standards it is not verifiable at all.


Verdict Explained

No source code found

Without public source available, this app cannot be verified!

This verdict means that we could not find any source to compile the app from. Internally the company might do everything right but as we can't verify it, there is nothing protecting the user from an exit-scam where the provider releases an app that leaks the keys to the servers.

The app cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The app might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.