Our wallet review process
We examine wallets starting at the code level and continue all the way up to the finished app that lives on your device. Provided below is an outline of each of these steps along with security tips for you and general test results.
Custody
Self-custodial: The user holds the keys
As part of our Methodology, we ask: Is the product self-custodial?
The answer is "yes". The user has control of their own keys.
Read more
Released
7th July 2020
Passed all 10 tests
We answered the following questions in this order:
The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Few users" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Few users".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Few users" and the following would apply:
We focus on products that have the biggest impact if things go wrong and this one probably doesn’t have many users according to data publicly available.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Fake".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Fake" and the following would apply:
The bigger wallets often get imitated by scammers that abuse the reputation of the product by imitating its name, logo or both.
Imitating a competitor is a huge red flag and we urge you to not put any money into this product!
The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Not a wallet".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Not a wallet" and the following would apply:
If it’s called “wallet” but is actually only a portfolio tracker, we don’t look any deeper, assuming it is not meant to control funds. What has no funds, can’t lose your coins. It might still leak your financial history!
If you can buy Bitcoins with this app but only into another wallet, it’s not a wallet itself.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "A wallet but not for Bitcoin" and the following would apply:
At this point we only look into wallets that at least also support BTC.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Can't send or receive bitcoins" and the following would apply:
If it is for holding BTC but you can’t actually send or receive them with this product then it doesn’t function like a wallet for BTC but you might still be using it to hold your bitcoins with the intention to convert back to fiat when you “cash out”.
All products in this category are custodial and thus funds are at the mercy of the provider.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Custodial: The provider holds the keys" and the following would apply:
A custodial service is a service where the funds are held by a third party like the provider. The custodial service can at any point steal all the funds of all the users at their discretion. Our investigations stop there.
Some services might claim their setup is super secure, that they don’t actually have access to the funds, or that the access is shared between multiple parties. For our evaluation of it being a wallet, these details are irrelevant. They might be a trustworthy Bitcoin bank and they might be a better fit for certain users than being your own bank but our investigation still stops there as we are only interested in wallets.
Products that claim to be non-custodial but feature custodial accounts without very clearly marking those as custodial are also considered “custodial” as a whole to avoid misguiding users that follow our assessment.
This verdict means that the provider might or might not publish source code and maybe it is even possible to reproduce the build from the source code but as it is custodial, the provider already has control over the funds, so it is not a wallet where you would be in exclusive control of your funds.
We have to acknowledge that a huge majority of Bitcoiners are currently using custodial Bitcoin banks. If you do, please:
- Do your own research if the provider is trust-worthy!
- Check if you know at least enough about them so you can sue them when you have to!
- Check if the provider is under a jurisdiction that will allow them to release your funds when you need them?
- Check if the provider is taking security measures proportional to the amount of funds secured? If they have a million users and don’t use cold storage, that hot wallet is a million times more valuable for hackers to attack. A million times more effort will be taken by hackers to infiltrate their security systems.
The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "No source for current release found".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "No source for current release found" and the following would apply:
A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.
Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.
An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.
For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.
If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.
“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.
We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet. You should still prefer actual open source licenses as a competing wallet won’t use the code without giving it careful scrutiny.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Failed to build from source provided!" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Failed to build from source provided!".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Failed to build from source provided!" and the following would apply:
Published code doesn’t help much if the app fails to compile.
We try to compile the published source code using the published build instructions into a binary. If that fails, we might try to work around issues but if we consistently fail to build the app, we give it this verdict and open an issue in the issue tracker of the provider to hopefully verify their app later.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.The answer is "yes".
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Not reproducible from source provided" and the following would apply:
The answer is "no". We marked it as "Not reproducible from source provided".
We did not ask this question because we failed at a previous question.
If the answer was "no", we would mark it as "Not reproducible from source provided" and the following would apply:
Published code doesn’t help much if it is not what the published binary was built from. That is why we try to reproduce the binary. We
- obtain the binary from the provider
- compile the published source code using the published build instructions into a binary
- compare the two binaries
- we might spend some time working around issues that are easy to work around
If this fails, we might search if other revisions match or if we can deduct the source of the mismatch but generally consider it on the provider to provide the correct source code and build instructions to reproduce the build, so we usually open a ticket in their code repository.
In any case, the result is a discrepancy between the binary we can create and the binary we can find for download and any discrepancy might leak your backup to the server on purpose or by accident.
As we cannot verify that the source provided is the source the binary was compiled from, this category is only slightly better than closed source but for now we have hope projects come around and fix verifiability issues.
The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.
Application build test result
Update 2023-07-23: The provider has fixed the reproducibility issues. So we had another try with v0.7.7-beta1,
Here are the results after running the test script (?) which is based on the provider’s build script:
===== Begin Results =====
appId: app.zeusln.zeus
signer: 2af8e20ac9445767cbd44ed84dbbfc33c6c98248897c4f843c42c2765c4ad3ba
apkVersionName: 0.7.7-beta1
apkVersionCode: 74
verdict: reproducible
appHash: 7518899284438a824779266807c91dedb1714517e2f94f8cbe878482379c1b0e
commit: 6644683e7b81c9aaf9288d77c14a89a01c088d2a
Diff:
Only in /tmp/fromPlay_app.zeusln.zeus_74/META-INF: MANIFEST.MF
Only in /tmp/fromPlay_app.zeusln.zeus_74/META-INF: ZEUS-KEY.RSA
Only in /tmp/fromPlay_app.zeusln.zeus_74/META-INF: ZEUS-KEY.SF
Revision, tag (and its signature):
===== End Results =====
Which looks good. Gladly, This binary is reproducible.
Update 2023-06-21: The provider claimed reproducibility, closing
our respective issue on 2022-08-29,
a time at which we had no funding. The provider reminded me (Leo) of this in
March and apparently I did start work on this as
an incomplete build script
was added but I added it with
this commit
where it did not belong. By accidentally adding it to this commit, my work in
progress disappeared from my “desk” so to say.
Apologies for forgetting about this interesting project for so long. There is no
excuse and we are improving our scripts to circle back to products in a
more timely fashion. Time to reproduce their current version 0.7.6:
Zeus: Bitcoin and Lightning provided documentation for reproducible builds here.
Let’s see if we can run this in a container. We don’t want to run changing scripts on our machine without a container to avoid effects on other parts of our system …
Chosing a container for android builds …
$ podman run -it --rm --volume=$PWD:/mnt --workdir /mnt mreichelt/android:latest bash
root@d529e4616416:/mnt# git clone https://github.com/ZeusLN/zeus
root@d529e4616416:/mnt# cd zeus/
root@d529e4616416:/mnt/zeus# git checkout v0.7.6
root@d529e4616416:/mnt/zeus# ./build.sh
./build.sh: line 7: docker: command not found
Ok, the build script itself wants to start a container using docker. We have to copy its commands into our build script as running nested docker is complicated.
root@d529e4616416:/mnt/zeus# cat build.sh
#!/bin/bash
# reactnativecommunity/react-native-android:7.0
BUILDER_IMAGE="reactnativecommunity/react-native-android@sha256:7bbad62c74f01b2099163890fd11ab7b37e8a496528e6af2dfaa1f29369c2e24"
CONTAINER_NAME="zeus_builder_container"
ZEUS_PATH=/olympus/zeus
docker run --rm --name $CONTAINER_NAME -v `pwd`:$ZEUS_PATH $BUILDER_IMAGE bash -c \
'echo -e "\n\n********************************\n*** Building Zeus...\n********************************\n" && \
cd /olympus/zeus ; yarn install --frozen-lockfile && \
cd /olympus/zeus/node_modules/@lightninglabs/lnc-rn ; bash fetch-libraries.sh && \
cd /olympus/zeus/android ; ./gradlew app:assembleRelease && \
echo -e "\n\n********************************\n**** APKs and SHA256 Hashes\n********************************\n" && \
cd /olympus/zeus && \
for f in android/app/build/outputs/apk/release/*.apk;
do
RENAMED_FILENAME=$(echo $f | sed -e "s/app-/zeus-/" | sed -e "s/-release-unsigned//")
mv $f $RENAMED_FILENAME
sha256sum $RENAMED_FILENAME
done && \
echo -e "\n" ';
Fair enough. Let’s try that. reactnativecommunity/react-native-android@sha256:7bbad62c74f01b2099163890fd11ab7b37e8a496528e6af2dfaa1f29369c2e24 appears to be a neutral image we can assume not to be controlled by the provider. With 3.46GB it is though much bigger than any other image we used so far. For the purpose of this test, we assume that these 3.46GB do not introduce any backdoor but would prefer a less complex image.
Trying out the command line by line interactively. That’s better to understand what’s going on.
$ podman run -it --rm --volume=$PWD:/olympus/zeus --workdir /mnt --name zeus_builder_container reactnativecommunity/react-native-android@sha256:7bbad62c74f01b2099163890fd11ab7b37e8a496528e6af2dfaa1f29369c2e24 bash
root@bb1bfd4bf69e:/mnt# cd /olympus/zeus ; yarn install --frozen-lockfile
yarn install v1.22.19
[1/4] Resolving packages...
[2/4] Fetching packages...
[3/4] Linking dependencies...
...
[4/4] Building fresh packages...
$ rn-nodeify --install --hack; npx jetify; yarn run patch; react-native setup-ios-permissions; yarn run install-lnc; pod-install
not overwriting "assert"
not overwriting "browserify-zlib"
rn-nodeify --install --hack; npx jetify; yarn run patch sounds mildly scary
but reviewing in detail is beyond our scope.
failed to parse node_modules/resolve/test/resolver/malformed_package_json/package.json
hacking /olympus/zeus/node_modules/assert/assert.js
hacking /olympus/zeus/node_modules/form-data/package.json
hacking /olympus/zeus/node_modules/iconv-lite/package.json
Something failed. More “hacking”. So far we only ran yarn install which runs
package.json’s postinstall: rn-nodeify --install --hack; npx jetify; yarn run patch; react-native setup-ios-permissions; yarn run install-lnc; pod-install which contains steps for the iOS app that we are not planning to build here.
yarn run install-lnc also appears to be doing the same as the next command
from build.sh: cd /olympus/zeus/node_modules/@lightninglabs/lnc-rn ; bash fetch-libraries.sh. Subsequently the 77 and 170MB downloads are run twice.
yarn run v1.22.19
$ git apply patches/rnqli-build.gradle.patch
Done in 0.06s.
warn Package react-native-blob-util contains invalid configuration: "dependency.hooks" is not allowed. Please verify it's properly linked using "react-native config" command and contact the package maintainers about this.
warn Package react-native-vector-icons contains invalid configuration: "dependency.assets" is not allowed. Please verify it's properly linked using "react-native config" command and contact the package maintainers about this.
yarn run v1.22.19
$ cd node_modules/@lightninglabs/lnc-rn; yarn run fetch-libraries
$ bash fetch-libraries.sh
% Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current
Dload Upload Total Spent Left Speed
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 --:--:-- --:--:-- --:--:-- 0
100 77.0M 100 77.0M 0 0 2475k 0 0:00:31 0:00:31 --:--:-- 1733k
% Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current
Dload Upload Total Spent Left Speed
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 --:--:-- --:--:-- --:--:-- 0
100 170M 100 170M 0 0 1015k 0 0:02:51 0:02:51 --:--:-- 2702k
And then came a bunch of warnings:
WARNING:We recommend using a newer Android Gradle plugin to use compileSdk = 33
This Android Gradle plugin (7.2.1) was tested up to compileSdk = 32
This warning can be suppressed by adding
android.suppressUnsupportedCompileSdk=33
to this project's gradle.properties
The build will continue, but you are strongly encouraged to update your project to
use a newer Android Gradle Plugin that has been tested with compileSdk = 33
WARNING:The specified Android SDK Build Tools version (23.0.1) is ignored, as it is below the minimum supported version (30.0.3) for Android Gradle Plugin 7.2.1.
Android SDK Build Tools 30.0.3 will be used.
and more warnings.
- Gradle detected a problem with the following location: '/olympus/zeus'. Reason: Task ':app:bundleReleaseJsAndAssets' uses this output of task ':react-native-image-picker:compileReleaseAidl' without declaring an explicit or implicit dependency. This can lead to incorrect results being produced, depending on what order the tasks are executed. Please refer to https://docs.gradle.org/7.5.1/userguide/validation_problems.html#implicit_dependency for more details about this problem.
Lines like this: 316
And after that, the script stopped for the past hour.
Time to try out what Emanuel did to reproduce this product.
Just running the script with the new version number failed, complaining about:
> Could not find method compile() for arguments [directory 'libs'] on object of type org.gradle.api.internal.artifacts.dsl.dependencies.DefaultDependencyHandler.
That looks like the patch from above. Adding this … and with a few more rounds of trying, the result was again a build process stuck at what the past approach got stuck at. 316 warnings and no further output.
Now already familiar with the provided build script, we try this, too:
$ git clone --depth 1 --branch v0.7.6 https://github.com/ZeusLN/zeus.git
Cloning into 'zeus'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 545, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (545/545), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (476/476), done.
remote: Total 545 (delta 120), reused 312 (delta 43), pack-reused 0
Receiving objects: 100% (545/545), 8.35 MiB | 3.76 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (120/120), done.
$ cd zeus/
zeus((no branch))$ ./build.sh
********************************
*** Building Zeus...
********************************
yarn install v1.22.19
[1/4] Resolving packages...
[2/4] Fetching packages...
[3/4] Linking dependencies...
warning " > @react-navigation/bottom-tabs@5.11.11" has incorrect peer dependency "@react-navigation/native@^5.0.5".
warning " > lottie-react-native@5.1.5" has unmet peer dependency "lottie-ios@^3.4.0".
warning " > mobx-react@6.1.4" has incorrect peer dependency "react@^16.8.0 || 16.9.0-alpha.0".
warning "mobx-react > mobx-react-lite@1.5.2" has incorrect peer dependency "react@^16.8.0".
warning "react-native > react-native-codegen > jscodeshift@0.13.1" has unmet peer dependency "@babel/preset-env@^7.1.6".
...
> Task :react-native-tor:copyReleaseJniLibsProjectAndLocalJars
> Task :react-native-tcp:generateReleaseRFile
> Task :react-native-tor:compileReleaseRenderscript NO-SOURCE
> Task :react-native-tcp:extractReleaseAnnotations
> Task :react-native-tcp:compileReleaseJavaWithJavac FAILED
/olympus/zeus/node_modules/react-native-tcp/android/src/main/java/com/peel/react/TcpSockets.java:8: error: package android.support.annotation does not exist
import android.support.annotation.Nullable;
^
/olympus/zeus/node_modules/react-native-tcp/android/src/main/java/com/peel/react/TcpSocketManager.java:3: error: package android.support.annotation does not exist
import android.support.annotation.Nullable;
^
/olympus/zeus/node_modules/react-native-tcp/android/src/main/java/com/peel/react/TcpSockets.java:105: error: cannot find symbol
public void connect(final Integer cId, final @Nullable String host, final Integer port, final ReadableMap options) {
^
symbol: class Nullable
location: class TcpSockets
/olympus/zeus/node_modules/react-native-tcp/android/src/main/java/com/peel/react/TcpSocketManager.java:122: error: cannot find symbol
public void connect(final Integer cId, final @Nullable String host, final Integer port) throws UnknownHostException, IOException {
^
symbol: class Nullable
location: class TcpSocketManager
Note: /olympus/zeus/node_modules/react-native-tcp/android/src/main/java/com/peel/react/TcpSockets.java uses or overrides a deprecated API.
Note: Recompile with -Xlint:deprecation for details.
4 errors
FAILURE: Build completed with 2 failures.
1: Task failed with an exception.
-----------
* What went wrong:
Execution failed for task ':react-native-tcp:compileReleaseJavaWithJavac'.
> Compilation failed; see the compiler error output for details.
* Try:
> Run with --stacktrace option to get the stack trace.
> Run with --info or --debug option to get more log output.
> Run with --scan to get full insights.
==============================================================================
2: Task failed with an exception.
-----------
* What went wrong:
java.lang.StackOverflowError (no error message)
* Try:
> Run with --stacktrace option to get the stack trace.
> Run with --info or --debug option to get more log output.
> Run with --scan to get full insights.
==============================================================================
* Get more help at https://help.gradle.org
Deprecated Gradle features were used in this build, making it incompatible with Gradle 8.0.
You can use '--warning-mode all' to show the individual deprecation warnings and determine if they come from your own scripts or plugins.
See https://docs.gradle.org/7.5.1/userguide/command_line_interface.html#sec:command_line_warnings
BUILD FAILED in 4m 26s
Execution optimizations have been disabled for 11 invalid unit(s) of work during this build to ensure correctness.
Please consult deprecation warnings for more details.
528 actionable tasks: 528 executed
which also ended in errors. At this point we give up and file this version as not verifiable, waiting for this issue to be resolved.
Original Analysis
This app is a bit special as it does not hold your private keys but neither is it custodial. It remote-controls your lightning node that you can run for example at home. So it is a wallet in that you can use it to send and receive Bitcoins.
And … best of all:
Furthermore our builds have no proprietary dependencies, are reproducible, and are distributed on F-Droid.
they claim to have reproducible builds! Being on F-Droid this is highly likely to be reproducible for us, too. Let’s see how it goes:
On the repository there is no special mention of reproducible builds. Only that the Play Store release is built from the play-releases branch.
In that play-releases branch there is no special mention on reproducibility neither. The build instructions end in:
npm i
react-native run-android
but react-native run-android is not a command to create the apk. It’s to
install the app on a connected device. We’ll go with
cd android
./gradlew assembleRelease
instead.
Also we will need version 0.5.1 which is the latest version we got from the Play Store. (The following is the pruned version after some detours.)
$ git clone https://github.com/ZeusLN/zeus
$ cd zeus/
$ git tag | grep 0.5.1
v0.5.1
$ git checkout v0.5.1
$ docker run -it --volume $PWD:/mnt --workdir /mnt --rm beevelop/cordova bash
root@b5e24bbdc208:/mnt# npm install
root@b5e24bbdc208:/mnt# npm install stream
root@b5e24bbdc208:/mnt# yes | $ANDROID_HOME/tools/bin/sdkmanager "platforms;android-28"
root@c6e507f0b5dc:/mnt# npx react-native run-android
root@b5e24bbdc208:/mnt# cd android
root@c6e507f0b5dc:/mnt/android# echo -e "\nMYAPP_RELEASE_KEY_ALIAS=a\nMYAPP_RELEASE_KEY_PASSWORD=aaaaaa\nMYAPP_RELEASE_STORE_PASSWORD=aaaaaa\nMYAPP_RELEASE_STORE_FILE=../dummy.keystore" >> gradle.properties
root@c6e507f0b5dc:/mnt# keytool -genkey -v -keystore dummy.keystore -alias a -keyalg RSA -keysize 2048 -validity 10
(entering password aaaaaa and all the rest defaults.)
root@b5e24bbdc208:/mnt/android# ./gradlew assembleRelease
BUILD SUCCESSFUL in 40s
564 actionable tasks: 279 executed, 285 up-to-date
root@c6e507f0b5dc:/mnt/android# ls -alh app/build/outputs/apk/release/
total 126M
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4.0K Apr 8 04:28 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4.0K Apr 8 04:28 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18M Apr 8 04:28 app-arm64-v8a-release.apk
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 17M Apr 8 04:28 app-armeabi-v7a-release.apk
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 55M Apr 8 04:28 app-universal-release.apk
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 19M Apr 8 04:28 app-x86-release.apk
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 19M Apr 8 04:28 app-x86_64-release.apk
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1.7K Apr 8 04:28 output.json
root@c6e507f0b5dc:/mnt/android# exit
$ apktool d -o fromGoogle Zeus\ 0.5.1\ \(app.zeusln.zeus\).apk
$ apktool d -o fromBuild android/app/build/outputs/apk/release/app-universal-release.apk
$ diff --brief --recursive from{Google,Build}
Files fromGoogle/AndroidManifest.xml and fromBuild/AndroidManifest.xml differ
Files fromGoogle/apktool.yml and fromBuild/apktool.yml differ
Files fromGoogle/assets/index.android.bundle and fromBuild/assets/index.android.bundle differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/arm64-v8a/libimagepipeline.so and fromBuild/lib/arm64-v8a/libimagepipeline.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/arm64-v8a/libnative-filters.so and fromBuild/lib/arm64-v8a/libnative-filters.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/arm64-v8a/libnative-imagetranscoder.so and fromBuild/lib/arm64-v8a/libnative-imagetranscoder.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/arm64-v8a/libsifir_android.so and fromBuild/lib/arm64-v8a/libsifir_android.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/arm64-v8a/libv8android.so and fromBuild/lib/arm64-v8a/libv8android.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/armeabi-v7a/libimagepipeline.so and fromBuild/lib/armeabi-v7a/libimagepipeline.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/armeabi-v7a/libnative-filters.so and fromBuild/lib/armeabi-v7a/libnative-filters.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/armeabi-v7a/libnative-imagetranscoder.so and fromBuild/lib/armeabi-v7a/libnative-imagetranscoder.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/armeabi-v7a/libsifir_android.so and fromBuild/lib/armeabi-v7a/libsifir_android.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/armeabi-v7a/libv8android.so and fromBuild/lib/armeabi-v7a/libv8android.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/x86/libimagepipeline.so and fromBuild/lib/x86/libimagepipeline.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/x86/libnative-filters.so and fromBuild/lib/x86/libnative-filters.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/x86/libnative-imagetranscoder.so and fromBuild/lib/x86/libnative-imagetranscoder.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/x86/libsifir_android.so and fromBuild/lib/x86/libsifir_android.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/x86/libv8android.so and fromBuild/lib/x86/libv8android.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/x86_64/libimagepipeline.so and fromBuild/lib/x86_64/libimagepipeline.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/x86_64/libnative-filters.so and fromBuild/lib/x86_64/libnative-filters.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/x86_64/libnative-imagetranscoder.so and fromBuild/lib/x86_64/libnative-imagetranscoder.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/x86_64/libsifir_android.so and fromBuild/lib/x86_64/libsifir_android.so differ
Files fromGoogle/lib/x86_64/libv8android.so and fromBuild/lib/x86_64/libv8android.so differ
Files fromGoogle/original/AndroidManifest.xml and fromBuild/original/AndroidManifest.xml differ
Only in fromBuild/original/META-INF: CERT.RSA
Only in fromBuild/original/META-INF: CERT.SF
Only in fromGoogle/original/META-INF: GOOGPLAY.RSA
Only in fromGoogle/original/META-INF: GOOGPLAY.SF
Files fromGoogle/original/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF and fromBuild/original/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF differ
Only in fromGoogle/res/raw: node_modules_browserifyaes_modes_list.json
Only in fromGoogle/res/raw: node_modules_browserifysign_browser_algorithms.json
Only in fromGoogle/res/raw: node_modules_browserifysign_browser_curves.json
Only in fromGoogle/res/raw: node_modules_diffiehellman_lib_primes.json
Files fromGoogle/res/raw/node_modules_elliptic_package.json and fromBuild/res/raw/node_modules_elliptic_package.json differ
Only in fromGoogle/res/raw: node_modules_parseasn1_aesid.json
Files fromGoogle/res/values/public.xml and fromBuild/res/values/public.xml differ
and that’s a lot of diffs in a lot of different files. The app cannot be reproduced from the existing source code given the not given build instructions(?). The app is not verifiable.
Tests performed by Leo Wandersleb, mohammad
Previous application build tests
| 22nd June 2023 | 0.7.6 | |
| 30th August 2021 | 0.5.1 |
Disclaimer
Our Analysis is not a full code review! We plan to make code reviews available in the future but even then it will never be a stamp of approval but rather a list of incidents and questionable coding practice. Nasa sends probes to space that crash due to software bugs despite a huge budget and stringent scrutiny.
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