This app was first launched on 20th June 2018 and currently has more than 10000 downloads, a 4.3 stars rating from 669 users and the latest APK (version 1.32.0) was from 21st March 2020.
We found these ways of contacting the developers:
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The following Analysis is not a full code review! We plan to make code reviews available in the future but even then it will never be a stamp of approval but rather a list of incidents and bad coding practice. We cannot find and tell you all the dark secrets the wallet providers might have.
Do your own research!
Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.
This app gets straight to the point:
The wallet is non-custodial, meaning the private keys never leave the secure storage of your phone.
but can we verify this?
On their website we find a link to their GitHub but none of
- wallet-connect-android Binance implementation of Wallet Connect protocol as kotlin library
- ScatterKit ScatterKit allows communication between Swift applications and web pages that use Scatter plugin
- Paytomat-iOS-SDK Send transactions and get account information via Paytomat Wallet
- Paytomat-Android-SDK Send transactions and get account information via Paytomat Wallet
- paytomat-api Docs for various Paytomat APIs
sounds like an actual Wallet.
Searching GitHub for their app id yields 401 results which we should not be tasked to look through one by one.
So for now we assume it is closed source and come to the verdict: not verifiable.
Not verifiable: No Open Source Code found
This verdict means that we could not find any source to compile the app from. Internally the company might do everything right but as we can't verify it, there is nothing protecting the user from an exit-scam where the provider releases an app that leaks the keys to the servers.
The app cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The app might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.