Help spread awareness for build reproducibility
Please help us spread the word discussing transparency with ZenGo: Crypto & Bitcoin Wallet via their Twitter!
Do your own research!
Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.
The Analysis ¶
On their website we find:
Backing up your wallet is just as simple. An encrypted copy of your device share is stored on the ZenGo server, and the decryption code is stored separately in your personal iCloud (iOS) or Google (Android) account. Only with your 3D biometric face map can you access the encrypted share.
Does that mean that with a photo of you (and probably without) a google engineer can access your backup? That’s a bit scary.
So they claim it is non-custodial but do they share the source code? On that, they link to this blog post where they conclude:
As open-sourcing our code is a step we cannot take back, we prefer to take a cautious approach to it. We already released some portions of our code and intend to gradually release more and more of our software as open source as we gain more confidence in out process and more momentum within the community.
… but for audits, it doesn’t need to be “Open Source” in the sense of this quote. It can just be public code. For audits only.
Their decision to not be transparent earns them the verdict not verifiable.
Without public source of the reviewed release available, this app cannot be verified!
As part of our Methodology, we ask:Is the source code publicly available? If not, we tag it
A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.
Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.
An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.
For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.
If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.
“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the app being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the app’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.
We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet.
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