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Blubitex

latest release: 2.1.337 ( 10th September 2021 ) last analysed  11th September 2021 No source for current release found 
3.4 ★★★★★
2679 ratings
50 thousand
3rd October 2020

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Do your own research!

Try out searching for "lost bitcoins", "stole my money" or "scammers" together with the wallet's name, even if you think the wallet is generally trustworthy. For all the bigger wallets you will find accusations. Make sure you understand why they were made and if you are comfortable with the provider's reaction.

If you find something we should include, you can create an issue or edit this analysis yourself and create a merge request for your changes.

The Analysis 

2021-09-06: The app is currently under maintenance. Users can sign in through the web application only.

The Privacy Policy is titled as

P2P User Transaction Policy.
The platform is not a party to a C2C transaction. Therefore, any disputes between Users engaging in C2C transactions have nothing to do with the platform. The platform has neither the rights nor the obligations to resolve any disputes arising therefrom. It is not obliged to assume physical obligations or responsibilities to any party (including but not limited to indemnities).

However it is required for users to comply with the KYC policy. There’s also no mention of private keys, self-custody, or available source code on the website.

Verdict: While it’s possible that this app is not-custodial, we do not currently have access to the app to verify this.

Tentatively, we assume there is no source for the current release. We’ll then await the response of their support.

(dg)

Verdict Explained

Without public source of the reviewed release available, this product cannot be verified!

As part of our Methodology, we ask:

Is the source code publicly available? If not, we tag it No Source! 

A wallet that claims to not give the provider the means to steal the users’ funds might actually be lying. In the spirit of “Don’t trust - verify!” you don’t want to take the provider at his word, but trust that people hunting for fame and bug bounties could actually find flaws and back-doors in the wallet so the provider doesn’t dare to put these in.

Back-doors and flaws are frequently found in closed source products but some remain hidden for years. And even in open source security software there might be catastrophic flaws undiscovered for years.

An evil wallet provider would certainly prefer not to publish the code, as hiding it makes audits orders of magnitude harder.

For your security, you thus want the code to be available for review.

If the wallet provider doesn’t share up to date code, our analysis stops there as the wallet could steal your funds at any time, and there is no protection except the provider’s word.

“Up to date” strictly means that any instance of the product being updated without the source code being updated counts as closed source. This puts the burden on the provider to always first release the source code before releasing the product’s update. This paragraph is a clarification to our rules following a little poll.

We are not concerned about the license as long as it allows us to perform our analysis. For a security audit, it is not necessary that the provider allows others to use their code for a competing wallet.

The product cannot be independently verified. If the provider puts your funds at risk on purpose or by accident, you will probably not know about the issue before people start losing money. If the provider is more criminally inclined he might have collected all the backups of all the wallets, ready to be emptied at the press of a button. The product might have a formidable track record but out of distress or change in management turns out to be evil from some point on, with nobody outside ever knowing before it is too late.